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I. INTRODUCTION
Broadly viewed, all trial evidence falls into one of four catego-
ries: testimonial, documentary, real, or demonstrative. Through these
four types of evidence attorneys hope to persuade the finder of fact
to accept their theory of the case. Although each type of evidence
is important, most lawyers regard the elicitation of testimonial, or
spoken-word evidence, as the most challenging aspect of trial. Con-
ducting good direct and effective cross-examination is difficult be-
cause it always involves the element of unpredictability that
accompanies any process which relies on the human element.
The goal of direct examination is to have a credible witness tell
a truthful story that is understandable, sympathetic, and therefore
persuasive. Impeachment is the process by which the opposing party
seeks to undermine the credibility of the witness through examination
or the introduction of extrinsic evidence, designed to directly attack,
or at least diminish, the believability of the witness. Rehabilitation
is the process by which the proponent of a witness's testimony
attempts to undo any damage done to the believability of the witness
through impeachment.
The key to the entire evidentiary process is, of course, persua-
sion. Legal publications are full of articles that attempt to explain
how juries are persuaded. While these articles are undoubtedly useful,
no one has been able to substantially improve on Aristotle's theory
that when the spoken word is involved, persuasion occurs as a result
of three interrelated concepts: ethos-the ethical appeal or character
of the speaker, pathos-the emotion, compassion, or sympathy of
the subject matter, and logos-the spoken word, or logic.' Thus, for
1. Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word, there are three
kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the
second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the
proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion
is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken
as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more
readily than others .... Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers,
when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgments when we are pleased and
friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile .... Thirdly,
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example, a sympathetic story told logically may still be rejected by
the jury if it perceives the witness to be a liar-poor ethos. A
truthful, prominent, expert witness who testifies logically may none-
theless have little impact on the jury's decision if his or her testimony
is so dry and technical that it fails to interest the jury-poor pathos.
Finally, a respectable witness who tells a sympathetic story will not
be persuasive if the testimony itself is confused, contradictory, or
implausible-poor logos.
Through the process of impeachment, trial lawyers attempt to
juggle these three components of persuasion in an effort to highlight
for the jury shortcomings in the witness's character, the believability
of the testimony, or to negate any sympathy the witness may have
developed with the jury. Through rehabilitation, attorneys seek to
address these same three aspects of the witness's testimony to repair
any damage that has occurred. The newly enacted Maryland Rules
of Evidence2 provide an assortment of rules that are the tools with
which attorneys may accomplish these goals. Accordingly, a full
understanding of these rules is essential in order to be a competent
and artful trial attorney. This Article will address these rules and
how they interrelate.3
II. OVERVIEW
The Maryland Rules of Evidence that affect the process of
impeachment and rehabilitation reflect three important concepts.
These concepts also underlie the Maryland Rules of Evidence in
persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth
or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case
in question. RICHARD McKEON, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (RHETORIC)
1329-30 (1968).
2. MD. RULES 5-101 to 5-1008 (effective July 1, 1994).
3. It is beyond the scope of this Article to comprehensively discuss the background
and development of each rule, or to extensively compare them with their federal
counterparts. Fortunately for the reader, that has already been done by
Professor McLain in her new book. LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF
EVIDENCE (1994) [hereinafter MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE]. The focus of
this Article will be on the interrelationships between the various Maryland
Rules of Evidence to show how they govern the process of impeachment and
rehabilitation. It must be recognized that no serious analysis of the law of
evidence in Maryland may be undertaken without noting the enormous contri-
bution of two people, Professor Lynn McLain of the University of Baltimore
School of Law, and Judge Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., of the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland. For years, Professor McLain's work on Maryland
Evidence, state and federal, and Judge Murphy's Maryland Evidence Hand-
book, JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1993),
have provided the attorneys and judges of this state with guidance and counsel
on evidentiary issues. They are owed an enormous debt of gratitude, which
this writer respectfully acknowledges.
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general. First, evidence that has no tendency to establish or negate
some fact that is important to the litigation is not relevant under
Maryland Rule 5-401, 4 and is therefore inadmissible under Maryland
Rule 5-402.1 Second, even if the evidence is relevant, it will not be
admitted if doing so would sidetrack the jury or improperly delay
the trial. Thus, relevant evidence is excluded under Maryland Rule
5-4036 if it will confuse or mislead the jury, waste time, or is simply
repetitive.' The third principle underlying the Maryland Rules of
Evidence is that the presentation of evidence during trial must be
done fairly. Indeed, Rule 5-102 directs that all of the rules of evidence
shall be construed to "secure fairness in administration." ' 8 Rule 5-
403 prohibits the introduction of relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Similarly, Rule 5-4049 generally prohibits proof of character traits to
show propensity to act in conformity with a trait 0 because of the
unfairness associated with inviting the jury to conclude that "because
he did it before, he must have done it in this case."" Therefore, in
4. MD. RULE 5-401.
5. MD. RULE 5-402.
6. MD. RULE 5-403.
7. This principle also underlies the provisions in Rule 5-608(b) and Rule 5-616(b)
regarding when extrinsic impeaching evidence is allowed. MD. RULES 5-608(b),
5-616(b). Further, the general requirements of Rule 5-611(a) that the court
control the examination of witnesses to make the presentation of evidence
effective and timely, and the general requirement of Rule 5-611(b) that the
scope of cross-examination be limited to the subject matter of direct exami-
nation and matters which affect the credibility of witnesses also evidence this
principle. MD. RULE 5-611.
8. MD. RULE 5-102.
9. MD. RULE 5-404.
10. However, an important exception to this general rule prohibiting character
evidence to show propensity is Rule 5-608 that does permit opinion and
reputation testimony about a witness's character trait for truthfulness or
untruthfulness.
11. Concepts of fair play are found in Maryland Rule 5-106 (allowing introduction
of the remainder of or related writings or recorded statements), Rule 5-412
(limiting the evidence relating to a victim's sexual history in a rape or sexual
offense case), and Rule 5-609 (regarding impeachment by evidence of conviction
of a crime). Similarly, Rule 5-613(b)'s general requirement that extrinsic evi-
dence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement may not be introduced unless
the witness has first been confronted with the contents of, and circumstances
surrounding the making of, the statement, and an opportunity to explain or
deny is also based upon notions of fairness. MD. RULE 5-613(b). The same is
true for the requirements of Rule 5-608(a)(4) and (b) that, upon objection, the
court must conduct a hearing to determine whether a reasonable factual basis
exists to permit certain types of impeachment. Finally, Rule 5-610's prohibition
against attempts to impeach or enhance a witness's credibility by inquiring into
matters of religious belief or opinion is also based on notions of fairness. MD.
RULE 5-610.
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planning how impeachment and rehabilitation will be conducted
during trial, counsel must keep these principles of relevance, econ-
omy, and fairness in mind.
From a structural point of view, impeachment and rehabilitation
can occur either through the direct or cross-examination of a witness,
or through the introduction of extrinsic testimony or documentary
evidence.12 Attorneys need to know when each method is appropriate.
Maryland Rule 5-616 provides guidance in this regard. Rule 5-616(a)
identifies the six most frequent methods of impeachment'3 of a
witness's credibility through examination. 14 Rule 5-616(b) sets out the
seven most frequent methods of attacking credibility through the
introduction of extrinsic evidence.'" Keeping these important princi-
ples in mind, this Article will now examine in greater detail the
applicable Maryland Rules of Evidence relating to the process of
impeachment and rehabilitation.
The primary rules of evidence relating to impeachment and
rehabilitation deal with witnesses and are found in Title 5, Chapter
600 of the Maryland Rules. However, it is important not to overlook
a collection of evidentiary rules found in other chapters of Title 5
that also affect this process. These rules will be examined before
turning to Chapter 600.
III. RELEVANCE AND RELATED CONCEPTS-RULES 5-401,
5-402, 5-403
Rule 5-401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
12. MURPHY, supra note 3, § 1300, at 636.
13. As Professor McLain notes, Rule 5-616 has no counterpart in the Federal Rules
of Evidence. It is "consistent with and declaratory of the pertinent federal case
law construing Fed. R. Evid. 401-04, and is intended merely to organize the
Maryland law so as to make it more accessible." MARYLAND RULES OF Evi-
DENCE, supra note 3, at 183. While Rule 5-616 tantalizingly implies that other
methods of impeachment may exist, those listed certainly are the primary means
to attack credibility, and will be the most frequently used. Indeed, it has been
said that there are only five main lines of attack on the credibility of a witness:
prior inconsistent statement, bias, poor character for truthfulness, defect in
capacity, and contradiction of the witness's testimony by other witnesses.
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 33, at 66 (Edward Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972).
14. Because Rule 5-607 allows the credibility of a witness to be attacked by "any
party, including the party calling the witness," the methods of impeachment
listed in Rule 5-616(a) may be employed during either direct examination or
cross-examination. MD. RULES 5-607, 5-616(a).
15. MD. RULE 5-616(b)(1) to (7).
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it would be without the evidence.' ' 6 Thus, this Rule includes within
the definition of relevance the concept of "materiality," in that only
facts that are "of consequence to the determination of the action"
are material. 7 Rule 5-402 states that "[e]vidence that is not relevant
is not admissible." Further, Rule 5-403 permits the court to exclude
evidence that is relevant if any of the following factors substantially
outweigh the probative value of the evidence: (1) the evidence will
create unfair prejudice; (2) the evidence will cause confusion of the
issues or mislead the jury; or (3) the introduction of the evidence
would involve undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
The effect of these rules on the process of impeachment and
rehabilitation is clear. Rule 5-401 embraces the concept of "weight
versus admissibility," meaning that to be admissible a particular fact
need not have sufficient weight by itself to fully prove a fact of
consequence to the litigation, but need only make that fact more
probable, or less probable if the goal is to disprove a material fact,
than it would have been without the evidence. For example, if a
witness's trial testimony differs from her pretrial deposition testimony
on a number of points, any one of which viewed alone would not
greatly affect her credibility, the opposing attorney is still allowed
under Rule 5-401 to explore each example of prior inconsistency. 9
The existence of each inconsistent statement makes her credibility
less convincing than it would have been without the evidence.
Rule 5-403 provides balance by enabling the court to restrict the
introduction of impeaching evidence if its probative value is so slight
that to introduce it would unduly delay the trial, waste time, or be
needlessly cumulative. The tension created by the interaction between
Rule 5-401 and Rule 5-403 is important to the process of impeachment
and rehabilitation. Lawyers planning the impeachment of a witness
are allowed under Rules 5-401 and 5-402 to offer all facts that detract
from the credibility of the witness, including the following: (1) that
the witness has testified inconsistently with prior statements; (2) that
the facts that the witness testified to are not as stated; (3) that
opinions stated by the witness are not believable; (4) that the witness
is biased, prejudiced, interested in the outcome of the trial, or has
a motive to testify falsely; (5) that the witness lacks personal knowl-
16. MD. RULE 5-401.
17. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 91.
18. MD. RULE 5-402.
19. This is true provided that counsel complies with Rule 5-613 that requires the
examining party (1) to disclose the transcript of the deposition to the witness
and the parties prior to completing examination of the witness, and (2) to give
the witness the opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency. See MD. RULE
5-613(a)(1), (2).
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edge of the facts testified to or has defective abilities to perceive,
remember, or communicate; and (6) that the witness has a bad
character for truthfulness either because of prior bad acts that affect
his/her truthfulness or because of a prior conviction of an infamous
crime or crime relevant to credibility. 20
Indeed, Rule 5-616 invites attorneys to consider each of these
areas of impeachment. The counterbalance to Rule 5-616 is provided
by Rule 5-403, which allows opposing counsel to object to efforts to
impeach that would cause any of the undesirable consequences iden-
tified in that Rule. Because Rule 5-403 allows the court to employ a
balancing test, prudent counsel will adopt a common sense approach
to impeachment. Evidence that has minimal impeaching weight is
less likely to be admitted if objected to, and may even backfire if
introduced. For example, the fact that the witness once made a
comment about the plaintiff that reflects dislike for the plaintiff
could be offered under Rule 5-616(a)(4) as impeaching evidence of
bias. However, if the remark was a single statement made ten years
before the trial, it may be of such slight value in impeaching the
witness that offering it may appear trivial, even unfair, in the eyes
of the jury resulting in sympathy for the witness, pathos, and a
concomitant reduction of the ethos of the cross-examiner. 21 Counsel
must also be mindful that if an objection to the evidence is sustained
by the court, the lawyer offering the evidence may lose credibility,
ethos, in the eyes of the jury. 22 In preparing for impeachment,
therefore, lawyers must take into account not only all facts which
under Rule 5-401 would be relevant to the credibility of the witness,
but also the impact of these facts, singly and collectively, on how
persuasive the impeachment will be to the jury.
20. MD. RULE 5-616(a)(1) to (6).
21. This danger is often associated with efforts to impeach by prior inconsistent
statements, where the cross-examiner painstakingly points out each and every
inconsistent statement made by the witness during a prior deposition, a process
which juries often find tedious, dull, and petty. The fact that the rules broadly
permit many forms of impeachment does not mean that using each available
one is the most persuasive way to undermine the credibility of the witness.
Knowing which method of impeachment to use with a particular witness involves
the art of advocacy, the careful assessment of the three factors of spoken word
persuasion, experience, and often luck.
22. It is important to keep in mind that both the ethos of the witness and the
attorney questioning the witness are at work in determining how the fact finder
is persuaded. A poor assessment of the examining attorney can diminish or
negate the persuasive effect of what a witness says during testimony. For
example, a lawyer who bullies a witness into making impeaching statements
during cross-examination may evoke sympathy for the witness, and cause the
jury to disregard the effect of the impeaching evidence. Again, Aristotle's
concepts of ethos, pathos, and logos are instructive. See supra note 1 and
accompanying text (discussing Aristotle's concepts).
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IV. CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND IMPEACHMENT
CONCEPTS-RULE 5-404
There is an interesting dichotomy in the Maryland Rules of
Evidence regarding character evidence. Rule 5-404(a)(1) states the
general rule that evidence of a person's character, or a particular
character trait, is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion
that person acted in conformity with that trait.2 3 This Rule recognizes
that attempting to prove conduct in a particular instance simply by
showing conduct in a prior, unrelated instance, "is of somewhat
inferior persuasive force ' 24 and involves a substantial danger of
prejudice. 25 However, when the credibility of a person is at issue,
instead of his or her conduct in a particular instance, that person's
character trait for truthfulness or untruthfulness is valuable evidence
to provide to the jury. Accordingly, Rule 5-404(a)(1)(C) carves out
an exception to the general prohibition against propensity character
evidence and permits a Rule 5-608 inquiry into a witness's character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Rule 5-608, however, contains its
own safeguards against possible unfair prejudice by restricting the
methods of proving character for truthfulness or untruthfulness to
the two methods approved in Rule 5-405(a)-reputation and opin-
ion. 26 Proof of this character trait by specific acts evidence that is
"most likely to create prejudice and hostility" is also excluded. 27
Thus, Rules 5-404 and 5-608 demonstrate another important concept
of evidence law that is embodied in the Maryland Rules of Evidence-
evidence may be inadmissible for one purpose, yet admissible for
23. Rule 5-404(a)(l)(A) and (B), however, provide important exceptions and qual-
ifications to this general rule.
24. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, at 442.
25. Id.; see also 5 LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND PRACTICE-MARYLAND EVIDENCE
STATE AND FEDERAL § 404.1 n.1 (1987) [hereinafter MARYLAND PRACTICE]
(citing Braxton v. State, 11 Md. App. 435, 274 A.2d 647 (1971) (holding that
in a criminal case neither prosecution nor defense may offer evidence of general
good or bad character; holding that character evidence is only relevant if
probative of a particular character trait, the existence or lack of which would
be involved in the commission of the crime; and discussing circumstances when
character evidence is admissible)); MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note
3, at 98 (citing State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 552 A.2d 896 (1989) (holding
that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal acts may not be introduced to
prove guilt in a patticular case; such evidence is confusing, and may unfairly
prejudice their minds; stating exception to general rule excluding such evidence,
i.e., proof of motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme or plan,
identity, opportunity, preparation, or knowledge)); MURPHY, supra note 3, at
262, (citing Wise v. Ackerman, 76 Md. 375 (1892) (holding that evidence of
prior similar occurrence is inadmissible as collateral, distracting to jury, and
not probative as to causation)).
26. MD. RULE 5-608(a)(3)(B).
27. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, at 443.
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another. 28 With respect to the process of impeachment, attorneys
must be able to distinguish when proof of character evidence is
permitted; when it is allowed, they must understand how it may be
proven. Maryland Rules 5-404, 5-405, and 5-608 provide this direc-
tion.
V. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS AND HEARSAY-RULES 5-
104, 5-806
The importance attached to preserving the ability of attorneys
to explore the credibility of witnesses is highlighted by two Maryland
Rules of Evidence: Rule 5-104 addressing preliminary questions and
Rule 5-806 regarding hearsay and the credibility of the declarant.
Rule 5-104(a) allows the court, when deciding preliminary ques-
tions regarding a person's qualifications to be a witness, the existence
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence, to "decline to require
strict application of the rules of evidence, except those relating to
privilege and competency of witnesses. ' 29 Simple expediency requires
this Rule because "to hold applicable the rules of evidence (such as
those regarding hearsay and authentication) in determining whether
the foundation facts necessary to the admission of evidence have
been proved would create an insuperable Catch-22." 30
Although Rule 5-104(a) may allow the judge to relax the Rules
of Evidence in determining a preliminary matter, Rule 5-104(e) states
that "[t]his rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce
before the trier of fact evidence relevant to weight or credibility.'"'3
This is an important qualification. For example, assume that the trial
court has made a preliminary determination under Rule 5-104(a) that
a witness offered as an expert is qualified in accordance with Rule
5-702. The effect of this ruling is that the expert's opinion will then
be admitted to the jury. However, Rule 5-104(e) preserves for op-
posing counsel the right to attack the credibility of that opinion by
any of the methods recognized by Rule 5-616.32 Similarly, a judge's
28. See, e.g., MD. RULES 5-105, 5-610 (precluding introduction of evidence of
religious beliefs or opinions to attack or enhance credibility, but allowing such
evidence if introduced to show interest or bias). When evidence is admitted
for one purpose but is inadmissible for another, the attorney opposing the
introduction of the evidence should ask for a limiting instruction from the
court in accordance with Rule 5-105.
29. MD. RULE 5-104(a).
30. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 67.
31. MD. RULE 5-104(e).
32. Actually, Rule 5-616 is not intended to provide the exclusive methods of
impeachment. Instead, it is merely intended to reflect the most frequently used
methods of impeachment in a single place in order to facilitate the use of
those methods by counsel. As the Committee Note for Rule 5-616 states, "[tihis
19941
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preliminary determination that a document is admissible under Rule
5-803(b)(6) as a business record exception to the hearsay rule would
not deprive opposing counsel of the right to attack the credibility of
the maker of the business record by showing that he or she had a
motive to mislead. 33
Rule 5-806 contains another significant, but easy to overlook,
safeguard regarding the ability of counsel to impeach the credibility
of witnesses. It provides:
When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence,
the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if
attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would
be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified
as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the
declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant's hear-
say statement, is not subject to any requirement that the
declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny
or explain. If the parties against whom a hearsay statement
has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party
is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if
under cross-examination. 34
The logic of this Rule is apparent. The exceptions to the hearsay
rule all function to provide the fact finder with "statements ' ' 35 made
by a "declarant. ' ' 36 Each recognized exception to the rule against the
admissibility of hearsay is based on the existence of some circum-
stantial indicia of trustworthiness. Generally, this circumstantial guar-
antee is sufficient to warrant the introduction of the statement
without the protection afforded to opposing counsel who may test
the credibility of the declarant on cross-examination. Rule 5-806
returns to opposing counsel a large measure of the protection usually
afforded by the process of cross-examination. It enables him to
impeach the credibility of the "absent witness" who made the hearsay
statement by any method that could have been employed had the
declarant actually been present to testify.
Rule 5-608 also relaxes the requirement of Rule 5-613, regarding
impeachment by prior statements of the declarant, by suspending the
Rule is intended to illustrate the most frequently used methods of impeachment
and rehabilitation. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to foreclose other
legitimate methods." MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 181.
33. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 72.
34. MD. RULE 5-806(a).
35. A "statement" is defined by Rule 5-801(a) as "(1) an oral or written assertion
or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person., if it is intended by the person as an
assertion." MD. RULE 5-801(a).
36. A "declarant" is defined by Rule 5-801(b) as "a person who makes a state-
ment." MD. RULE 5-801(b).
[Vol. 24
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provisions of Rule 5-613(a) that provide that the declarant be afforded
an opportunity to deny or explain the statement before it may be
introduced. Therefore, for example, if a hearsay statement is admit-
ted, under Rule 5-803(b)(3), as evidence of a declarant's then existing
state of mind to prove his future action, opposing counsel may
impeach the credibility of the declarant by introducing extrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement without having to confront
the declarant with the inconsistent statement and afford him the
chance to deny or explain it. Rule 5-806 also permits the proponent
of the hearsay statement to subsequently rehabilitate the credibility
of the declarant once it has been attacked.3 7
Finally, Rule 5-806 further underscores the importance of the
process of impeachment as a vehicle for determining the truth. This
is accomplished by allowing the party opposing the hearsay statement
to actually call the declarant to the stand and cross-examine him
through leading questions in accordance with Rule 5-616(a).3 s
VI. IMPEACHMENT IN GENERAL
A. Who May Impeach-Rule 5-607
Maryland Rule 5-607 provides that "the credibility of a witness
may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the wit-
ness." 3 9 This Rule mirrors the old Maryland Rule 1-50140 that was
adopted as part of the Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure in 1988
in order to eliminate the common-law "voucher" rule. 41 Under the
37. Rule 5-806(b) contains an exception that is necessary in the interests of fairness.
It prohibits a party from introducing an admission of a party opponent under
Rule 5-803(a)(1) and (a)(2) when that party has not testified, and then proceed
to impeach that admission. MD. RULE 5-608(b); see also MARYLAND RULES OF
EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 286.
38. Rule 5-806 may also be important during pretrial proceedings. Assume, for
example, that counsel learns through discovery that her opponent intends to
offer at trial a hearsay statement of a witness who will be unavailable at trial,
as defined by Rules 5-804(a) and 2-419(a)(3). Using Rule 5-806, she could take
the deposition of the witness for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of
the witness. Then, under Rule 2-415(b), she may cross-examine the witness
during the deposition using leading questions, and subsequently offer the
transcript of the deposition of the cross-examination into evidence at trial
under Rule 5-804(b)(1) and Rule 2-419(a)(3). Of equal importance, the attorney
for the party who intends to offer the hearsay statement at trial would have
to use nonleading questions during the deposition. See Rule 2-415(b).
39. MD. RULE 5-607.
40. MD. RULE 1-501 (1994) (rescinded as of July 1, 1994).
41. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 80 Md. App. 187, 560 A.2d 605 (1989); PAUL V.
NIEMEYER & LINDA M. SCHUETT, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 67-68 (2d
ed. 1992).
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voucher rule, which had been followed in Maryland, a party was
generally prohibited from impeaching a witness who it called to
testify.4 2 The rationale behind the voucher rule was that the act of
calling the witness was viewed as an indication that party's belief in
the credibility of the witness. 43 At first blush, such a concept has
appeal, however, it frequently worked hardships, especially in crim-
inal cases where the prosecution was often forced to rely on the
testimony of witnesses whose character and credibility were not
always of sterling quality. Like its predecessor, Rule 1-501, Rule 5-
601 eliminates the voucher rule and allows an attorney to impeach
any witness, even her own.4
As a cautionary note, however, counsel should think carefully
about whether impeachment of her own witnesses helps her case.
Ordinarily, Rule 5-607 will be most helpful if used sparingly, for
example, when counsel is surprised at trial by testimony inconsistent
with an earlier statement made by the witness, or in circumstances
where it is impossible to avoid calling a witness who has an obvious
bias against the party calling the witness. In deciding whether to
impeach her own witness, an attorney should also consider the
possible effect on her ethos, and whether the pathos of the opposing
party will be enhanced by the impeachment. The Committee Note to
Rule 5-607 contains an important limitation designed to prevent use
of the Rule as a subterfuge to introduce inadmissible evidence. It
states:
This Rule eliminates the common law "voucher" rule. It
does not permit a party to call a witness solely as a subter-
fuge to place an otherwise substantively inadmissible state-
ment before the jury. It is not intended to otherwise affect
existing law concerning the court's discretion to control
direct and cross-examination.45
While Rule 5-607 allows impeachment of a witness during direct
examination, it is still true that in most instances the process of
impeachment occurs during cross-examination. Therefore, trial attor-
neys must fully understand the rules governing this mode of exam-
ining witnesses. Rule 5-611 provides this guidance.
42. See, e.g., Poole v. State, 290 Md. 114, 118, 420 A.2d 434, 437 (1981); General
Motors v. LaHocki, 286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980); MARYLAND PRACTICE,
supra note 25, § 607.1.C. n.20.
43. See MARYLAND PRACTICE, supra note 25, § 607.1.C.
44. MD. RULE 5-601.
45. MD. RULE 5-607 (Committee Note); see MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra
note 3, at 144. Professor McLain points out that the Committee Note likely
was based on Spence v. State, 321 Md. 526, 583 A.2d 715 (1991). MARYLAND
RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 144.
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B. Mode of Interrogation-Rule 5-611
First, Rule 5-611(a) vests the trial court with the authority to
control cross-examination. It states that "[t]he court shall exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses
and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of truth, (2) avoid need-
less consumption of time and, (3) protect witnesses from harassment
or undue embarrassment." 46 This Rule follows the approach taken
under Maryland common law. 47 In planning for cross-examination,
counsel should be mindful of Rule 5-611(a) and avoid overly aggres-
sive questioning that might be considered by the court as harassment.
Counsel should also be mindful of 'overly tedious examination on
small inconsistencies that contribute little to the overall assessment
of the witness's believability and, therefore, may be excluded by the
court as a waste of time. 48 Such questioning is also likely to diminish
the ethos of the attorney, and generate sympathy, pathos, for the
witness.
Rule 5-611(b) defines the scope of cross-examination which, with
the exception of cross-examination of a defendant in a criminal
trial, 49 should be limited to (1) the subject matter of the direct
examination and (2) matters affecting the credibility of the witness. 0
Thus, the scope of cross-examination will be governed by the content
of the direct examination and the credibility of the witness.',
46. MD. RULE 5-611(a).
47. See MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 162 (citing Bruce v. State,
318 Md. 706, 569 A.2d 1254 (1990); Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 468 A.2d
101 (1983); Cumberland & Westernport Transit Co. v. Metz, 158 Md. 424,
149 A. 4 (1930)).
48. Counsel must also keep in mind that if the trial judge forecloses cross-
examination on a subject that counsel believes is important to pursue, Rule 5-
103 must be followed to preserve the record for appeal. Rule 5-103(a)(2) states
that "[e]rror may not be predicated on a ruling that admits or excludes evidence
unless the party is prejudiced by the ruling" and, in the case where evidence
is excluded, the party makes an offer of proof detailing the substance of the
evidence, unless it was "apparent from the context within which the evidence
was offered." MD. RULE 5-103. In responding to a ruling that the attorney
feels improperly restricts a line or method of cross-examination, the attorney
should be aware of Rule 5-103(c), which favors making proffers under that
Rule outside the presence of the jury. In making the proffer, the attorney
should stress to the court why the party will suffer prejudice if the ruling
stands, as well as offer the substance of the evidence that was excluded by the
ruling.
49. Maryland Rule 5-611(b)(2) provides that when a defendant in a criminal trial
testifies on a nonpreliminary matter, he or she may be cross-examined on "any
matter relevant to any issue in the action." MD. RULE 5-611(b)(2).
50. MD. RULE 5-611(b)(1).
51. MURPHY, supra note 3, § 1206(A), at 626.
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With respect to the "content" component of cross-examination,
case law that fleshes out the boundaries of what constitutes matters
brought up during direct examination will still be important to keep
in mind. 2 Most helpful are the cases from the Court of Appeals of
Maryland that clarify that trial courts should not be overly restrictive
in their rulings on what was covered on direct examination." In this
regard, the following rule of thumb is very useful in determining
what is within the scope of direct examination, and, therefore, fair
game during cross-examination: "The 'scope of cross' must be meas-
ured by two standards: (1) what has been actually stated and (2)
what inferences logically flow from the words that were spoken.
Cross-examination that responds to either standard is within the
'scope of direct."' 5 4
52. For an excellent discussion of these cases see MARYLAND PRACTICE, supra note
25, § 611.1 & n.4. (citing Glover v. Gar-Bern Bldg. & Dev. Co., 264 Md. 388,
284 A.2d 434 (1972)) (cross-examination should be limited to matters covered
on direct, and subjects relevant to issues in the case, but inasmuch as purpose
of cross is to elicit the truth, the trial court has broad discretion to allow
inquiry during cross-examination into collateral matters); Bowers v. State, 298
Md. 115, 468 A.2d 101 (1983) (discussing the limits on the "doctrine of
completeness" rule that allows an opponent of evidence to require the remainder
of written or oral utterances to be introduced, or to inquire into them during
cross-examination; even during cross-examination utterances irrelevant to issues
in cases are not admissible, only so much of the utterance as is needed to
explain the first part may be offered, and nothing more, unless it aids in
understanding the utterance as a whole), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 890 (1986).
53. MARYLAND PRACTICE, supra note 25, at § 611.1 n.10 (citing State Rds. Comm'n
v. Wyvill, 244 Md. 163, 223 A.2d 146 (1966)) (scope of cross-examination of
expert witness is not limited by specific details brought out during direct, but
includes full inquiry into the subject matter of the testimony); Emery ex rel.
Calvert Ins. Co. v. F.P. Asher, Jr. & Sons, Inc., 196 Md. 1, 75 A.2d 333
(1950) (where a general subject is raised during direct, cross-examining attorney
may ask any relevant question on that general subject); Williams v. Graff, 194
Md. 516, 71 A.2d 450 (1950) (discussing the differences between the "English
Rule" of cross-examination, i.e., once testifying on direct, a witness is open
on cross to full exploration of all matters material to the case, and the
"American Rule," i.e., cross-examination limited to subject matter of direct,
as well as inquiry into possible bias, prejudice, or to lay foundation of prior
contradictory statements; noting that cross-examination is not limited to the
specific details of direct, but includes any relevant questions on the general
subjects brought out on direct; pointing out that in applying the rule that
identifies the limits of cross-examination, a court should not defeat the real
object of cross-examination-to elicit all the facts of any observation or
transaction that have not been fully explained).
54. MURPHY, supra note 3, § 1206(A), at 628. The authority granted to the trial
court to control both direct and cross-examination to avoid "needless con-
sumption of time" also allows the cross-examining attorney to ask the court
to permit examination of the witness regarding matters not fairly considered
to be within the scope of direct in order to save time by avoiding having to
recall the witness later during the cross-examiner's case. If the court allows
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With regard to the "credibility" component of cross-examina-
tion, the Maryland Rules of Evidence now provide a greater measure
of certainty in identifying what is appropriate for cross-examination.
Any of the six methods of impeachment listed in Rule 5-616(a)55
would be appropriate for inquiry during cross-examination.5 6 In
planning cross-examination, therefore, counsel would be well served
by making a list of each method of impeachment under Rule 5-
616(a) that she intends to pursue. If an objection is made to the
cross as being outside the scope of direct, counsel can respond by
explaining to the court that the cross-examination is appropriate
under Rule 5-611(b)(1), as affecting the credibility of the witness,
and by referring to the methods recognized by Rule 5-616(a) for
doing so.
Additionally, Rule 5-611 addresses the use of leading questions,
which impacts directly on the process of impeachment and rehabili-
tation. Rule 5-611(c) states:
The allowance of leading questions rests in the discretion
of the trial court. Ordinarily, leading questions should not
be allowed on the direct examination of a witness except as
may be necessary to develop the witness's testimony. Ordi-
narily, leading questions should be allowed (1) on cross-
examination or (2) on the direct examination of a hostile
witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an
adverse party.57
Rule 5-611(c) teaches two key lessons. First, it establishes that a
judge has great latitude in deciding whether to allow the use of
leading questions during an examination of a witness. As a result,
the judge is unlikely to be reversed on appeal with respect to such a
such examination, however, the questioning will have to comply with Rule 5-
611(c) regarding when leading and nonleading questions may be asked. See
also MURPHY, supra note 3, § 1206(A), at 627.
55. The six methods of impeachment are: (1) proof of prior inconsistent statements;
(2) proof that the facts are not as stated by the witness; (3) proof that an
opinion expressed by the witness is not held by the witness or otherwise not
worthy of belief; (4) proof that the witness is biased, prejudiced, interested in
the outcome of the proceeding, or has a motive to testify falsely; (5) proof
that the witness lacks personal knowledge or has a weakness in capacity to
perceive, remember or communicate; or (6) proof that the witness has the
character trait of untruthfulness under Rule 5-608(b) or prior conviction of a
crime adversely affecting credibility in accordance with Rule 5-609. MD. RULE
5-616(a)(1) to (6).
56. The list contained in Rule 5-616(a) is not exclusive, and any other legitimate
method of impeachment by examination that can be identified may also be
employed during cross-examination. See MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra
note 3, at 181 (quoting the Committee Note to Rule 5-616(a)).
57. MD. RULE 5-611(c).
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ruling.5" Second, Rule 5-611(c) teaches that there are no absolutes
with respect to the use of leading questions. Leading questions
"ordinarily" cannot be used on direct examination, unless to develop
the testimony of the witness, but, "ordinarily," are permitted on
cross-examination. 59
The key to understanding when it is permissible to use leading
questions is to, fully understand the definition of a leading question.
Contrary to popular belief, a leading question is not one that is
capable of being answered with a simple "yes" or "no," although
such questions can, under certain circumstances, be leading. Nor
does the use of the phrase "if any" automatically transform a leading
question into a non-leading one. Simply put, a leading question is
one in which the desired answer to the question is suggested by the
attorney, rather than the witness. This may be accomplished by the
words selected for use in the question, the tone of voice of the
questioner, the body language of the questioner, or any combination
of the above.60
Leading questions are usually not allowed during direct exami-
nation based on the assumption that there will exist a sympathy
between the attorney conducting the direct examination and the
witness. Accordingly, suggestions made by the attorney as to the
desired answer will be picked up by the witness, who will merely
agree with the suggested answer embodied in the lawyer's question.
Under this view, a leading question during direct examination threat-
ens to undermine the process of determining the true facts by allowing
the advocate to effectively replace the witness.
In contrast, it is generally assumed that during cross-examination
the witness will be hostile to the examining attorney. Greater control
over the witness's testimony, afforded by leading questions, is nec-
essary to allow the examining attorney to probe for and develop
matters that undermine the credibility of the witness. A witness is
not normally expected to divulge shortcomings in his or her credibility
absent the controlling influence of leading questions. While these
general assumptions are usually correct, there are circumstances where
leading questions are appropriate, even desirable, during direct ex-
amination, as well as circumstances where leading questions may be
inappropriate during cross-examination.
The use of leading questions can be extremely helpful, even
during certain direct examinations, because they can help to move
58. See MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 163; MURPHY, supra note
3, § 1205(A), at 619.
59. See MD. RULE 5-611(c).
60. See MURPHY, supra note 3, § 1205(A), at 620. Judge Murphy defines a leading
question as one that contains a material fact and clearly suggests the desired
answer. Id.
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the case along and avoid "needless consumption of time," ' 6' a goal
that Rule 5-611(a) seeks to promote. For example, during direct
examination it would be petty to object to the question-"You reside
at 620 Maple Street, don't you?"-when the residence of the witness
is not an important issue in the case. The proper function of Rule
5-611 (c)'s general prohibition against leading questions on direct is
to prevent the attorney from putting words into the mouth of the
witness with respect to important and disputed issues of fact.
Rule 5-611(c) does permit leading questions during direct ex-
amination to "develop the witness's testimony," yet it does not
define what is meant by this phrase. Judge Joseph F. Murphy, Jr.,
of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, provides the following
guidance on when leading questions may be used to develop the
witness's testimony during direct examination: (1) leading questions
may be used to establish an essential element of proof which is not
disputed or in contest; (2) leading questions may be used to establish
preliminary information (e.g., name, age, address, place of employ-
ment); (3) leading questions may be used as transition questions to
change the subject matter of the examination (e.g., "now, I would
like to direct your attention to . . . ."); (4) leading questions may
be used to lay the foundation for admissibility of other evidence
(e.g., to authenticate a photograph or lay the foundation for a
business record); (5) leading questions may be used to refresh the
recollection of a witness who goes "blank" during examination; (6)
leading questions may be used when questioning young children,
elderly witnesses, witnesses who have difficulty communicating, or
witnesses who are marginally competent; (7) leading questions may
be used in questioning an emotional witness about a traumatic
incident, or about a delicate subject matter (e.g., questioning a rape
victim); (8) leading questions may be used to question a hostile
witness or "turncoat" witness; (9) leading questions are permitted
when questioning an adverse party or a witness identified with an
adverse party;62 (10) leading questions are allowed when questioning
a witness called by the court; and (11) leading questions may be used
when impeaching a witness during direct examination in accordance
with Rule 5-607.63
If leading questions are not automatically barred during direct
examination, it is concomitantly true that Rule 5-611(c) does not
automatically permit leading questions during cross-examination. Thus,
if a lawyer is "cross-examining" her own client, who has been called
61. MD. RULE 5-611(a).
62. See MD. RULE 5-611 (c)(2).
63. See MURPHY, supra note 3, § 1205(a), at 620-21 (explaining examples one
through ten).
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during the opposing party's case as an adverse witness, cross-exam-
ination ordinarily should not be permitted by leading questions.
64
Similarly, cross-examination of a friendly witness or a witness clearly
identified with the party whose attorney is cross-examining the witness
should not be allowed by leading questions regarding disputed ma-
terial issues.
The importance of Rule 5-611(c) on the process of impeachment
and rehabilitation is clear. This Rule preserves the traditionally
accepted general right of the cross-examiner to use leading questions
to control the testimony of the witness, which greatly facilitates the
process of impeachment. Indeed, it is hard to imagine successful
impeachment by any of the means described in Rule 5-616 without
use of leading questions at some point during the examination.
65
Rule 5-611(c) also means that when the process of rehabilitation
is to be undertaken by redirect examination, instead of by introducing
extrinsic evidence, non-leading questions generally will be required.
However, because redirect examination, by definition, requires the
questioning attorney to address points brought out during cross-
examination by the opponent, it is almost unavoidable that the
attorney conducting redirect will want to use leading questions. To
the extent that leading questions would develop the testimony of the
witness under Rule 5-611(c), or avoid needless consumption of time
as provided by Rule 5-611(a), an attorney conducting redirect ex-
amination should be allowed greater latitude to use leading questions
than on direct examination.
C. Requirement of Personal Knowledge-Rule 5-602
Rule 5-602 requires that, with the exception of expert witnesses
qualified in accordance with Rule 5-703, a "witness may not testify
to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of
the witness's own testimony." ' 66 The Committee Note explains that
this Rule is not intended to prevent a witness from testifying as to
his or her age, date of birth, or similar matters of personal history,
where firsthand knowledge cannot be established. 67
64. See id. at 621.
65. For a helpful article describing how to use leading questions to control a
witness during cross-examination, see JAMES W. MCELHANEY, McELHANEY'S
TRIAL NOTEBOOK 299-317 (2d ed. 1987).
66. MD. RULE 5-602. Exceptions to this Rule are contained in Rule 5-703, regarding
expert testimony.
67. Rule 5-804(b)(4) permits hearsay testimony regarding facts relating to personal
or family history; MD. RULE 5-804(b)(4); see also MARYLAND RULES OF Evi-
DENCE, supra note 3, at 134.
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The function of Rule 5-602 .is obvious; it is designed to prevent
witnesses from giving testimony that is based on speculation or
conjecture, rather than fact. The policy that underlies Rule 5-602
does not prevent a witness from testifying to otherwise admissible
hearsay statements, provided that the witness actually heard the
hearsay statement made by the absent declarant. 61 Rule 5-602 also
does not preclude a lay witness from testifying in the form of an
opinion or inference, because Rule 5-701, which governs such non-
expert opinion testimony, requires as a condition precedent that the
opinion must be rationally based on the perception of the witness.
Rule 5-602 plays an important role in the process of impeach-
ment. In theory, there is a tidy distinction between what lay witnesses
may testify to 69 and what experts may testify to. 70 In real life,
however, the lines of demarcation are frequently less clear. During
direct examination witnesses often testify in narrative fashion, and,
indeed, lawyers are trained to ask as few questions on direct exam-
ination as possible to let the witness "tell her story." Human nature
is such that a witness will seldom begin the statement by announcing,
"I was present during the accident, paying attention, and personally
observed that . . . ." Often, it is apparent from the context of the
testimony that the witness was present when the events occurred, and
thus has firsthand knowledge of them. It is not unusual, however,
for witnesses to include speculation, conjecture, and opinions along
with a recitation of facts actually perceived. Moreover, the distinction
between "fact" and "opinion" is often difficult to define. 71
Rule 5-602's chief utility during impeachment is to allow the
cross-examiner to explore whether the witness had personal knowledge
of the facts testified to. However, this is a risky process. If the
cross-examining attorney does not know in advance whether the
witness has personal knowledge, it is hazardous to address this matter
on cross-examination due to the possibility that the credibility of the
witness may be enhanced if she testifies that she in fact does have
personal knowledge of the facts. Fortunately, however, the Maryland
Rules of Evidence provide the alert attorney with an alternative
method of determining whether a witness has personal knowledge of
the facts to be testified to.
Rule 5-104(a) requires the court to determine "[p]reliminary
questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness ' 72
68. See MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 274, at 586.
69. Generally, lay witnesses may only testify regarding facts actually perceived and
opinions or inferences based directly thereon. See MD. RULE 5-701.
70. In general, experts may testify to opinions and inferences, if based upon
information told to the expert by others, including inadmissible facts, if reliable.
See MD. RULE 5-703.
71. See MURPHY, supra note 3, § 603(A), at 328.
72. MD. RULE 5-104(a).
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and Rule 5-104(c) provides that "[h]earings on preliminary matters
shall be conducted out of the hearing of the jury when required by
rule or the interests of justice." 73 Thus, if a witness is called to
testify and the opposing party does not know whether the witness
has personal knowledge, and it is not apparent from the early stages
of direct examination that the witness has such knowledge, opposing
counsel may object and request, during a bench conference, that the
court conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the witness
has the personal knowledge required by Rule 5-602. The court will
likely require the sponsoring attorney to proffer whether the witness
has personal knowledge, which will educate the opposing counsel
without the risk of having the jury hear this information. 74 As with
all evidentiary objections, however, attorneys must use common sense
in determining when to use such an approach. Factors such as the
availability of pretrial discovery to determine the content of a wit-
ness's testimony and the importance of the facts of that testimony
should govern an attorney's decision.
If it is determined that the witness has testified to matters about
which she did not have personal knowledge, opposing counsel should
move to strike the offending testimony in accordance with Rule 5-
103 and request a curative instruction. If this will not fairly ameliorate
the situation, counsel may have to request a mistrial. Finally, im-
peachment of a witness by demonstrating that she lacks the personal
knowledge required by Rule 5-602 may be done either through
examination of the witness7 or through the introduction of extrinsic
impeaching evidence, testimonial or documentary.76
VII. PRIMARY MEANS OF IMPEACHMENT-RULE 5-616
Maryland Rule 5-616 was derived, in part, from an analysis of
federal case law construing Federal Rules of Evidence 401 through
403, 7 7 and, in part, from a proposal made by Professor Schmertz of
73. MD. RULE 5-104(c).
74. As an alternative to asking the court to conduct the preliminary inquiry after
the witness has started to testify, counsel could simply raise the issue of whether
the witness can comply with Rule 5-602's requirement for personal knowledge
in a bench conference before the witness takes the stand. A court's willingness
to entertain such a request will be influenced by whether the requesting attorney
diligently pursued available pretrial methods of determining who the trial
witnesses would be and what their testimony would entail. Thus, a court is
more likely to act favorably in situations where a "surprise" witness is called
or, in criminal matters, where extensive pretrial discovery is unavailable.
75. MD. RULE 5-616(a)(5).
76. MD. RULE 5-616(b)(4).
77. FED. R. EVID. 401-03.
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Georgetown Law School.78 Although there is no counterpart in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Maryland Rule 5-616 is consistent with
and declaratory of the federal rules. 79 Further, as the Committee
Notes to Rule 5-616 state, the Rule is intended to illustrate the most
frequent methods of impeachment and rehabilitation, but is not
intended to be an exhaustive list or to foreclose other legitimate
methods of impeachment and rehabilitation. 0
The chief utility of Rule 5-616 is that it collects in one place a
succinct summary of the primary means of impeachment and reha-
bilitation, organized in a way that is logical and easy to follow at a
glance. It is especially helpful for practitioners and judges, and it is
easy to refer to in the middle of a trial. Rule 5-616 is organized into
three parts. Rule 5-616(a) identifies six methods of impeachment of
witnesses through direct and cross-examination.8 ' Rule 5-616(b) iden-
tifies seven methods of impeachment through the introduction of
extrinsic evidence, 2 and Rule 5-616(c) describes the four most fre-
quent means of rehabilitation. 3
78. Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
125th Report, proposed Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Procedures: Evidence
(July 1993) [hereinafter July 1993 Committee Report] (citing John R. Schmertz,
Jr., The First Decade under Article VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Some
Suggested Amendments to Fill Gaps and Cure Confusion, 30 VILL. L. REV.
1367, 1414-17 (1985)).
79. Id. at 86; MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 183.
80. July 1993 Committee Report, supra note 78, at 86; MARYLAND RULES OF
EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 181.
81. The six methods are:
(1) proof under Rule 5-613 that the witness has made a prior incon-
sistent statement;
(2) proof that the facts are not as testified to by the witness;
(3) proof that an opinion expressed by the witness is not held by the
witness, or that the opinion is otherwise not worthy of belief;
(4) proof that the witness is biased, prejudiced, interested in the
outcome of the proceeding, or has a motive to testify falsely;
(5) proof that the witness lacks personal knowledge or has a weakness
in the capacity in his/her capacity to perceive, remember or commu-
nicate;
(6) proof that the witness has a poor character for truthfulness by
establishing prior bad acts in accordance with Rule 5-608(b) or estab-
lishing a prior conviction as allowed by Rule 5-609.
MD. RULE 5-616(a)(1) to (6).
82. The seven methods are:
(1) extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements, as allowed by
Rule 5-613(b);
(2) other extrinsic evidence contradicting the witness's testimony,
provided the subject is a non-collateral matter, unless, in the discretion
of the court, collateral extrinsic evidence is permitted;
(3) extrinsic evidence of bias, prejudice, interest, or other motive to
testify falsely, regardless of whether the witness has been confronted
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Although the drafters of Rule 5-616 took pains to point out that
the methods described in the Rule for impeachment and rehabilitation
were not exhaustive and not meant to foreclose other legitimate
methods of impeachment and rehabilitation,8 4 examples of such ad-
ditional legitimate methods do not readily spring to mind. Indeed,
an examination of learned treatises on evidence suggests that Rule 5-
616 contains the universe of impeachment and rehabilitation tech-
niques which one can reasonably expect to encounter. 85 Nonetheless,
there is wisdom in the approach taken by the drafters of the Maryland
Rules of Evidence.
Although the techniques for impeachment and rehabilitation may
be finite, the factors in a particular case that contribute to whether
the fact finder will believe the testimony of a witness are not. A jury
may choose to disregard entirely the testimony of an apparently
credible witness, whose testimony was not impeached through cross-
examination or extrinsic evidence simply because the witness appeared
insincere, mean spirited, or unfair. As Aristotle would no doubt
point out, even if the ethos and logos of a witness remains intact,
the testimony of that witness may still emerge as unpersuasive if the
with these facts during examination;
(4) extrinsic evidence of a witness's lack of personal knowledge, or
weakness in the capacity of the witness to perceive, remember, or
communicate, provided the witness has been confronted with these
facts during examination, or unless the court otherwise permits the
introduction of such extrinsic evidence;
(5) extrinsic evidence of the character of a witness for untruthfulness,
as permitted by Rule 5-608;
(6) extrinsic evidence of prior convictions as allowed by Rule 5-609;
and
(7) extrinsic evidence that prior consistent statements offered under
Rule 5-616(c)(2) in fact were not made.
MD. RULE 5-616(b)(1) to (7).
83. The four means of rehabilitation are:
(1) permitting the witness to deny or explain impeaching facts (except
that a witness impeached by prior conviction may not deny the guilt
of the earlier crime);
(2) except as provided by statute, evidence of the witness's prior
statements that are consistent with the witness's present testimony,
provided the statement detracts from the prior impeachment;
(3) evidence through other witnesses of the impeached witness's char-
acter for truthfulness, as provided by Rule 5-608(a); and
(4) other evidence that the court finds relevant for the purposes of
rehabilitation.
MD. RULE 5-616(c)(1) to (4).
84. See MD. RULE 5-616 (Committee Note).
85. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 180-85; MURPHY, supra note
3, at 635; MARYLAND PRACTICE, supra note 25, § 607, at 37; MCCORMICK,
supra note 13, at 66.
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pathos was unfavorable to the party who calls the witness.8 6 Lawyers'
lore is full of examples of cases that should have been lost, but
which were won, and vice-versa, and of "jury nullification" of cases
that were technically unassailable. Experienced trial lawyers always
acknowledge with a shake of the head that "anything can happen in
trial." No matter how well one organizes and understands the meth-
ods of impeachment and rehabilitation, the ultimate decision whether
the witnesses are believable, and therefore persuasive, will rest with
the fact finder.
Because the human factors that go into the judgment rendered
by jurors and judges in particular cases are infinite, it would approach
hubris to assert that a single rule of evidence has captured all the
ways to credit and discredit the testimony of a witness. Fortunately,
it is enough to do what Rule 5-616 does well-to thoughtfully collect
and set forth the primary methods of impeachment and rehabilitation.
With this in mind, each of the primary methods of impeachment
and rehabilitation will now be examined.
VIII. CHARACTER FOR TRUTHFULNESS OR
UNTRUTHFULNESS-RULE 5-608
Maryland Rule 5-608 governs the use of evidence regarding the
character of a witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness. The Rule
addresses both impeachment and rehabilitation. As previously stated,
Rule 5-608 constitutes an exception to the general prohibition against
the use of character evidence to show propensity, which is found in
Rule 5-404. Thus, when evidence is introduced under Rule 5-608 to
show that a witness has the character trait of untruthfulness, the fact
finder is invited to reach the conclusion that the witness is not telling
the truth because he has a reputation for untruthfulness or because
some other witness is of the opinion that he is an untruthful person.
Rule 5-608 must be carefully read. It contains a great deal of
information and was intentionally structured differently from Federal
Rule of Evidence 608, on which Maryland Rule 5-608 was partially
based, to address criticism that the federal rule is confusing.8 7
Rule 5-608 is best understood if viewed as covering distinct facets
of a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Rule 5-
608(a) addresses two different situations. The first is the situation in
which witness B is called as a character witness to impeach or
rehabilitate the credibility of a previous witness, witness A, by
testifying as to witness A's reputation for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness or as to B's opinion of whether A is a truthful or untruthful
86. See generally McKEON, supra note 1.
87. July 1993 Committee Report, supra note 78, at 67.
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person. 8 The second situation to which Rule 5-608(a) applies is when
an effort is made to impeach B's character testimony regarding the
credibility of A, by cross-examining B about prior acts of truthfulness
or untruthfulness of A, or about convictions of A for crimes that
are relevant to A's truthfulness or untruthfulness, in accordance with
Rule 5-609. s9 Rule 5-608(b) deals with the separate situation in which
any witness, character witness or otherwise, is impeached by that
witness's own prior bad acts, other than convictions, which are
relevant to truthfulness or untruthfulness. 90
Expressed more simply, Rule 5-601(a) focuses on the use of a
character witness to provide reputation or opinion testimony about
some other witness's character for truthfulness. Rule 5-608(b) focuses
on the impeachment of any witness by that witness's own prior acts
that are probative of his own truthfulness or untruthfulness. With
this distinction in mind, Rule 5-608 may now be examined in greater
detail.
A. Use of Character Witnesses
1. Impeachment of Witness A Through the Use of Character
Witness B
Rule 5-608(a)(1) allows a party to call an impeaching character
witness (witness B) to testify that a prior witness (witness A) has a
reputation for untruthfulness or that, in B's opinion, A is an un-
truthful person. Rule 5-608(a)(3)(A) prohibits B from offering an
opinion regarding the truthfulness of A's testimony in the present
action, and Rule 5-608(a)(3)(B) prohibits B from testifying during
direct examination, as to any specific instances of truthfulness or
untruthfulness of A. B is allowed, however, by Rule 5-608(a)(3)(B)
to give a reasonable basis for the reputation or opinion of A, short
of testimony as to specific acts. Therefore, Rule 5-608(a) adopts the
provisions of Rule 5-405(a) that proof of a character trait may be
made by reputation or opinion testimony, but not by testimony as
to specific acts. Rule 5-608(a) also overrules Hemingway v. State91
to the extent that it permitted a character witness to testify during
direct examination as to the specific acts which formed the basis for
the character witness's reputation or opinion testimony.92
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id
91. 76 Md. App. 127, 543 A.2d 879 (1988).
92. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.608.4, at 149. However, the
Committee Note for Rule 5-608 clarifies that the Rule does not address when
[Vol. 24
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Rule 5-608(a)(3)(B) does not define what is meant by the state-
ment that a character witness may give a "reasonable basis" for her
reputation or opinion testimony during direct examination. However,
Professor McLain offers the following comments that flesh out this
provision:
A "reasonable basis" for reputation testimony under [Rule
5-608(a)(3)(B)] . . .would be that the character witness and
the other witness have both been members of a particular
community for a certain period of time, and that the char-
acter witness had heard of the other witness's reputation
there.
Similarly, a "reasonable basis" for opinion testimony
would be how long and under what circumstances the char-
acter witness knows the other witness, e.g., they have worked
side by side on the assembly line for ten years and they eat
lunch together every work day. 93
2. Cross-Examination of Character Witness B
Once character witness B has been called to impeach the credi-
bility of witness A by testifying as to A's reputation for untruthful-
ness or B's opinion that A is an untruthful person, Rule 5-608(a)(4)
governs how witness B may be impeached through cross-examination.
The Rule states: "The Court may permit a character witness to be
cross-examined about specific instances in which a witness has been
truthful or untruthful or about prior convictions of the witness as
permitted by Rule 5-609.''94 Thus, once character witness B has
testified about A's character for untruthfulness, the prohibition against
the use of specific acts is inapplicable during cross-examination. In
order to permit the cross-examiner to attack the basis for the char-
acter witness's reputation or opinion testimony, the cross-examiner
may ask if the character witness took into account specific acts that
proof of specific instances of conduct may be introduced for a purpose other
than impeachment by establishing a character for untruthfulness. Id. at 146.
Thus, evidence of specific acts may be admissible to show bias, interest, or
hostility under Rule 5-616(a)(4); or to show shortcomings in ability to observe,
remember, or relate facts under Rule 5-608(5); or to show motive, opportunity,
intent, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or lack of mistake or
accident under Rule 5-404(b); or to prove a character trait of a person which
is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense under Rule 5-405(b); or
under the "open door theory" to rebut evidence introduced by the opposing
side. Id. Once again, Rule 5-608 underscores the importance of Rule 5-105
that evidence may be admissible for one purpose, but inadmissible for another.
93. Id. at 149.
94. MD. RULE 5-608(a)(4).
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are inconsistent with the reputation or opinion testimony offered by
the character witness. When character witness B testifies that witness
A has a bad reputation for veracity or that, in B's opinion, A is not
a truthful person, the specific instances that may be probed during
cross-examination of B would involve instances of truthfulness by
A.
While Rule 5-608(a)(4) provides, as a matter of fairness, a
balance to the character witness's ability to impeach another witness's
credibility by allowing inquiry during cross-examination into specific
acts, there are important procedural restrictions on the ability of the
cross-examiner to do so. First, provided the attorney who called the
character witness to testify objects, the cross-examiner of a character
witness may not inquire into specific acts unless she, outside the
presence of the jury, "establishes a reasonable factual basis for
asserting that the prior instances occurred or that the convictions
exist, and . . . the prior instances or convictions are relevant to the
witness's reputation or the character witness's opinion, as appropri-
ate." 95 Therefore, it is essential that an attorney who calls a character
witness to attack the truthfulness of a prior witness be alert during
cross-examination of the character witness and make a timely objec-
tion and request for an out-of-court inquiry before specific instances
are raised during cross-examination. Otherwise, under Rule 5-103 any
objection to the propriety of the inquiry will be waived.
Although Rule 5-608(a) is silent in this regard, if the character
witness denies knowledge of the specific acts properly inquired into
during cross-examination, the attorney conducting the cross-exami-
nation may not subsequently offer into evidence extrinsic evidence
of these facts.96 Such a result is also consistent with Rule 5-608(b),
which prohibits proof through extrinsic evidence of prior bad acts
of a witness brought out during cross-examination. Finally, although
Rule 5-608(a)(4) addresses one means of impeachment of a character
witness through inquiry into specific acts, it does not preclude any
other appropriate method of impeachment, such as those listed in
Rule 5-616(a). 97 Once character witness B has been impeached as
described in the preceding section, he or she may then be rehabilitated
as provided by Rule 5-616(c). 98
3. Use of Character Witness B to Rehabilitate the Character of
Witness A
Character witnesses may also be used to rehabilitate a prior
witness whose credibility has been attacked. Rule 5-608(a)(2) provides
95. Id.
96. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.608.4, at 150.
97. Id.
98. Rule 5-616(c) identifies four methods of rehabilitation. See supra note 83
(listing the methods).
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that "[a]fter the character for truthfulness of a witness has been
attacked, a character witness may testify (A) that the witness has a
good reputation for truthfulness or (B) that in the character witness's
opinion the witness is a truthful person." When a character witness
is used to rehabilitate, the same limitations contained in Rule 5-
608(a)(3)(A) and (B) apply. Thus, rehabilitating character witness B
may testify on direct only as to the reputation of prior witness A
for truthfulness or may express an opinion that prior witness A is a
truthful person and may not testify on direct examination as to
specific instances of truthfulness. 100 However, B will be permitted to
give a reasonable basis for his reputation or opinion testimony. The
cross-examination of a rehabilitating character witness is the same as
permitted by Rule 5-608(a)(4) for impeachment of a character witness,
save for the fact that the specific instances inquired into will be of
the untruthful conduct of A, instead of the truthful conduct. Ac-
cordingly, the provisions of Rule 5-608(a)(4) regarding the holding
of an inquiry into the basis for specific acts of untruthful conduct
during cross-examination will also be required if a timely objection
has been made. Rehabilitation of a rehabilitating character witness
may also be accomplished in accordance with Rule 5-616(c).
B. Impeachment of a Witness, Character Witness or Otherwise,
by Examination Regarding the Witness's Own Prior Conduct
Other Than Convictions
Rule 5-608(b) permits the examination of any witness, regardless
of whether or not he is called as a character witness, regarding that
witness's own prior conduct that did not result in a conviction 1°' if
the court finds that the prior conduct is probative of a character
trait for untruthfulness. Rule 5-608(b) further provides, however,
that upon objection, the court may permit inquiry into the witness's
prior bad acts only if the examining attorney demonstrates, outside
the presence of the jury, that there is a reasonable factual basis for
asserting that the conduct occurred. Moreover, Rule 5-608(b) also
states that the prior bad acts may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
Thus, if the examining attorney asks the witness about a prior bad
act and the witness denies it, the examiner is bound by the answer
and may not prove the prior bad act through other means. 0 2 Finally,
99. MD. RULE 5-608(a)(2).
100. MD. RULE 5-608(a)(3)(B).
101. Rule 5-608(b) does not preclude impeachment by proof of a prior conviction,
it merely requires that it be done in accordance with Rule 5-609.
102. In the words of the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, "the questioner is bound by the witness's answer." July 1993
Committee Report, supra note 78, at 68.
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Rule 5-608(c) gives further protection to witnesses who are examined
regarding prior bad acts by stating that the giving of testimony does
not operate as a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination
when the witness is examined regarding matters that relate only to
credibility. 103
Rule 5-608 embodies several important principles of evidence
law. First, it highlights the importance that the character of a witness
plays on the process of persuasion by allowing a character witness
to testify as to the character trait of a prior witness for truthfulness
or untruthfulness and also by allowing the character of any witness,
whether character, lay, expert, primary, or rebuttal, to be examined
regarding prior bad acts probative of truthfulness. Thus, Rule 5-608
focuses the attention of the fact finder directly on the ethos of the
witnesses.
Second, Rule 5-608 contains safeguards necessary in the interest
of fairness to prevent abuse of inquiries into character. Accordingly,
the character witness cannot testify as to specific acts on direct
examination, but may have the basis for her opinion or reputation
testimony challenged by inquiry into specific acts during cross-ex-
amination. Similarly, Rule 5-608 promotes fairness by delaying in-
quiry into specific acts until after the questioner has demonstrated
outside the hearing of the jury that there is a reasonable basis for
asserting that the prior acts in fact occurred, provided a timely
objection has been made.' °4
Third, Rule 5-608 incorporates the principles of Rule 5-403 in
its prohibition against proof through extrinsic evidence of prior acts
under either 5-608(a) or (b). To allow such proof could confuse the
issues, mislead the jury, waste time, and unduly delay the trial by
turning the trial court's attention away from the real issues and into
a side show mini-trial regarding prior conduct of each witness called. 05
Once witness A has been impeached by witness B who testified
that witness A has a poor character for truthfulness, witness A may
be rehabilitated by testimony from a rehabilitating character witness
stating that witness A's character for truthfulness is good."°6 This
103. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.608.4(c), at 150.
104. MD. RULE 5-608(a)(4).
105. It is interesting to note that Rule 5-616(b)(2) allows the trial judge the discretion,
in general, to permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence on collateral matters.
One could argue that because Rule 5-616(b)(2) gives the court the discretion
to allow extrinsic evidence of collateral matters, this would include allowing
proof by extrinsic evidence of prior bad acts that Rule 5-608(a) and (b) do not
allow. However, because Rule 5-608 specifically prohibits extrinsic proof of
prior bad acts, and because Rule 5-616(b)(2) is a general rule, it should not be
read as enabling a court to override the specific prohibition contained in Rule
5-608. Moreover, because Rule 5-608 allows inquiry into prior acts in certain
circumstances, such evidence cannot fairly be regarded as "collateral" and,
thus Rule 5-616(b)(2) would not govern at all.
106. MD. RULE 5-616(c)(3).
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rehabilitation, however, must comply with the requirements of Rule
5-608(a)(2) and (3). Additionally, the witness may be rehabilitated by
any other means that the court determines is relevant for that
purpose, 07 including recalling the impeached witness to the stand to
deny or explain the impeaching facts. 08
Rule 5-608 presents some tactical challenges to attorneys. Sup-
pose, for example, that the plaintiff's attorney learns that the defen-
dant's expert witness claims in his resum6 to have published certain
articles and to have received certain awards that he did not. Obvi-
ously, making a false claim regarding publications and awards is
probative of the character trait of truthfulness. Armed with this
information, how can it be exploited to the maximum advantage to
impeach the expert? If the expert is confronted with the false infor-
mation for the first time during cross-examination, and denies the
fabrication of his qualifications, the plaintiff's attorney is bound by
the answer and cannot introduce extrinsic evidence to disprove it.
However, if raised during a pretrial deposition, the expert may have
time before trial to think of a plausible explanation, or the defen-
dant's attorney may simply select another expert. There is no risk-
free solution to this problem. The illustration merely underscores the
fact that counsel must pay careful attention to the limits imposed by
Rule 5-608 on proving prior acts relating to the character of a witness
for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
Additionally, Rule 5-608 highlights an area generally overlooked
during pretrial discovery. Rule 5-608 allows a character witness to
provide opinion testimony regarding the veracity of other witnesses. 109
When such testimony is provided by a credible, sincere witness,
supported by a good factual basis, it can have a dramatic effect on
the ethos and pathos of the case. While it is common practice during
pretrial discovery to uncover through interrogatories and depositions
the factual basis to support expert opinions, it is almost unheard of
to see such discovery directed at the identity of a character witness
or the factual basis for opinion evidence under Rule 5-608 or 5-
701. ° There is no doubt that under Rule 2-4021' the scope of
discovery is broad enough to permit an inquiry into the factual basis
of any opinion or reputation evidence to be offered under Rule 5-
608 and, indeed, an interrogatory directed to such information would
not be difficult to draft." 2 Accordingly, in a case where the credibility
107. MD. RULE 5-616(c)(4).
108. MD. RULE 5-616(c)(1).
109. MD. RULE 5-608(a)(1)(B).
110. Rule 5-701 pertains to the limitations of opinion testimony by lay witnesses.
111. MD. RULE 2-402.
112. An example of an interrogatory follows:
If you intend to offer testimony under Rule 5-608 regarding the
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of any witness, including
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 24
of a witness is likely to be an important factor in the outcome of
the trial, prudent counsel should attempt to develop during discovery
the identity of character witnesses and the factual basis for their
testimony.
Finally, when attempting to impeach the veracity of one witness
by calling another character witness to attack the credibility of the
prior witness under Rule 5-608, the attorney calling the character
witness must not overlook the ethos, or ethical appeal, of the
character witness. Unless the character witness's ethical appeal is
sufficiently greater than that of the prior witness and the factual
basis for the character witness's opinion or reputation testimony
sufficiently strong, the jury may be unwilling to afford greater credit
to the testimony of the character witness and may simply disregard
it entirely.
IX. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF A
CRIME-RULE 5-609
Maryland Rule 5-609 governs impeachment of witnesses by proof
of conviction of a crime. The Rule is based on Maryland Rule 1-
502" which was adopted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
the plaintiff/defendant, identify each character witness you expect to
testify, and for each one identified state with particularity the factual
basis to support the opinion or reputation testimony you expect that
witness to give.
113. Rule 1-502, Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime stated:
(a) Generally.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record
during cross-examination, but only if the crime was an infamous crime
or other crime relevant to the witness's credibility and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence out-
weighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or the objecting
party.
(b) Time Limit.-Evidence of a conviction under this Rule is not
admissible if a period of more than 15 years has elapsed since the
date of the conviction.
(c) Other Limitations.-Evidence of a conviction otherwise admissi-
ble under section (a) of this Rule shall be excluded if:
(1) the conviction has been reversed or vacated;
(2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon; or
(3) an appeal or application for leave to appeal from the judg-
ment of conviction is pending, or the time for noting an appeal or
filing an application for leave to appeal has not expired.
(d) Effect of Plea of Nolo Contendere.-For purpose of this Rule,
"conviction" includes a plea of nolo contendere followed by a sen-
tence, whether or not the sentence is suspended.
MD. RULE 1-502 (1994). This Rule was rescinded, effective July 1, 1994, and
replaced by Maryland Rule 5-609.
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November 1991 and went into effect on January 1, 1992.1'4 Rule 5-
609 is a perfect example of how the three general concepts of evidence
law-relevance, economy, and fairness-are applied. For example,
the fact that a witness has been convicted of a crime is not, in and
of itself, helpful in determining whether he or she is a truthful
person. The nature of the crime is an important factor. A witness
with a prior criminal conviction for a simple assault may very well
be expected to give honest testimony, while the testimony of a witness
with a prior conviction for mail fraud is more likely to be suspect.
The distinction is whether there is any logical connection between
the nature of the crime and the honesty of the person. Expressed
differently, the fact that a person was once convicted of simple
assault does not make it less likely that he will testify truthfully and,
therefore, under Rule 5-401 this evidence is not relevant to the issue
of credibility. Under Rule 5-403, the introduction of this evidence
would probably create unfair prejudice or confusion, or mislead the
jury. To permit the introduction of the prior assault conviction for
the purpose of impeachment would be to invite the jury to disbelieve
the witness simply because he once did something that was criminal,
which would be unfair.
There are three important requirements imposed by Rule 5-609.
First, it requires that there be both a logical nexus between the prior
conviction and the credibility of the witness, 15 and a showing that
the probative value of the evidence of prior conviction outweighs the
danger of unfair prejudice. 16 Second, Rule 5-609 recognizes that even
if a person has been convicted of a crime that is logically connected
to whether he is believable, the relevance of this information dimin-
ishes over time. Thus, for example, the fact that at age eighteen a
woman was convicted of theft has little tendency to undermine her
credibility if she testifies twenty years later. Thus, Rule 5-609 imposes
a fifteen-year time limit on the introduction of evidence of prior
conviction of a crime.1 7 Third, even if a person has been convicted
of a crime that is relevant to credibility, this evidence cannot fairly
be introduced unless the conviction is final, and should not be
admitted if the conviction was vacated or reversed, or a pardon was
issued." 8 Rule 5-609(c) addresses these "fairness factors" that further
restrict the introduction of such impeaching evidence. With these
general comments in mind, Rule 5-609 may now be examined in
more detail.
114. July 1993 Committee Report, supra note 78, at 70; MARYLAND RULES OF
EvIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.609.1, at 153.
115. MD. RULE 5-609(a)(1).
116. MD. RULE 5-609(a)(2).
117. MD. RULE 5-609(b).
118. MD. RULE 5-609(c) to (d).
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Rule 5-609(a) sets out the general requirements governing im-
peachment of a witness by evidence of a prior conviction. It allows
evidence of a prior conviction to be proved either by eliciting this
information from the witness during examination or by establishing
it by public record during the examination of the witness, but only
if "(1) [t]he crime was an infamous crime or other crime relevant to
the witness's credibility and (2) the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice to the witness or objecting party.""' 9
Rule 5-609(a) contains several important features. First, it re-
quires that the impeachment occur during the examination of the
witness, either through admission by the witness or the introduction
of the public record of the conviction. 20 Second, the use of the
phrase "during examination" includes direct examination and is
intended to allow an attorney who calls as a witness a person with
a prior conviction to "draw the sting" of this fact by bringing it
out first during direct.' 2' Third, Rule 5-609(a) restricts the type of
crime for which conviction may be used for impeachment to "infa-
mous crime[s] or other crime[s] relevant to the witness's credibil-
ity,' ' 22 but offers no further guidance regarding the definition of
these crimes. Judge Murphy points out that there are. four distinct
categories of prior convictions: (1) treason and all common-law
felonies; (2) crimen falsi-involving dishonesty, fraud, theft or ob-
struction of justice; (3) other crimes that reasonably bear on the
issue of credibility; and (4) other crimes that do not reasonably bear
on the issue of credibility. 23 The answer to whether convictions in
119. MD. RULE 5-609(a).
120. The requirement that proof of the conviction be established during the actual
testimony of the witness does not apply if the "witness" is a nontestifying
hearsay declarant, in which case the conviction may be proved through extrinsic
evidence. See MD. RULE 5-806(a); July 1993 Committee Report, supra note 78,
at 70; MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.609.4, at 157.
121. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.609.1, at 153.
122. MD. RULE 5-609(a).
123. MURPHY, supra note 3, § 1302(B), at 648 (citing Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348,
366, 535 A.2d 445, 454 (1988) (identifying the four different categories of
crimes with respect to impeachment: treason and common law felonies; crimen
falsi; other crimes reasonably bearing on credibility; and other crimes not
reasonably bearing on credibility)); see also MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE,
supra note 3, § 2.609.4, at 156 (citing Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 360, 535
A.2d 445, 451-52 (1988) (defining the crimen falsi as perjury, false statement,
criminal fraud, embezzlement, false pretense, or any other offense involving
some element of deceitfulness, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the
witness's propensity to testify truthfully); Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 269-
70, 619 A.2d 105, 108-09 (1993) (stating that theft is among the crimen falst)).
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the first three categories are admissible for impeachment requires the
court to examine "the elements essential to a conviction for that
crime, not the circumstances of the witness's conviction."'12 4 If this
analysis results in a conclusion that the prior conviction is relevant
to credibility, the court must then employ the balancing test required
by Rule 5-609(a)(2)125 to determine whether the evidence is admissible.
The requirement that the balancing test be used in all cases is taken
from Beales v. State.126 Professor McLain offers the following helpful
list of factors to be employed during this balancing test:
(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime;
(2) the remoteness of the conviction;
(3) the witness's subsequent history;
(4) the importance of the witness's credibility to the case,
and thus of evidence relevant to the witness's credibility;
(5) the risk of unfair prejudice, which is particularly high
if the witness sought to be impeached is the accused and
the prior conviction is for a crime similar to that for which
the accused is on trial. 2
7
Fourth, although Rule 5-609(a) is silent in this regard, only evidence
of the conviction itself is admissible, not the underlying details, 21
introduction of which would almost certainly confuse the issues,
sidetrack the jury, and cause undue delay. Thus, Rule 5-609(a) also
promotes the goals of economy and clarity.
Assuming the analysis of Rule 5-609(a) militates in favor of
admissibility of the evidence of prior conviction on the issue of
credibility of a witness, the court must then determine whether the
requirements of Rule 5-609(b) and 5-609(c) have been met before the
evidence is actually admitted. Rule 5-609(b) prohibits admissibility
of evidence of a conviction that is more than fifteen years old and
Rule 5-609(c) imposes additional restrictions on admissibility of such
evidence that has passed the threshold tests of 5-609(a) and (b). Rule
124. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.609.4(c), at 156.
125. This is the same balancing test described in Rule 5-403, except that it mandates
exclusion of the evidence of prior conviction unless the test is met, while Rule
5-403 mandates admissibility of evidence unless overriding prejudice is shown.
126. 329 Md. 263, 274, 619 A.2d 105, 110 (1993); see 1993 Committee Report,
supra note 78, at 70; MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2-609.4,
at 155-56.
127. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.609.4, at 156.
128. Id. (citing Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 468-71, 499 A.2d 1236, 1251-52 (1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986); Robinson v. State, 53 Md. App. 297, 304,
452 A.2d 1291, 1292 (1982)).
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5-609(c) states that evidence of a conviction otherwise admissible
under Rule 5-609(a) and (b) shall nonetheless be excluded if:
(1) the conviction has been reversed or vacated;
(2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon; or
(3) an appeal or application for leave to appeal from the
judgment of conviction is pending, or the time for noting
an appeal or filing an application for leave to appeal has
not expired. 1
29
Finally, Rule 5-609(d) addresses what is meant by a "convic-
tion," stating that for purposes of the Rule "conviction includes a
plea of nolo contendere followed by a sentence, whether or not the
sentence is suspended.' ' 30 A witness who has been found guilty but
who received probation before judgment under Article 27, section
641 of the Maryland Code 3' has not received a "conviction" for the
purposes of the Rule, and therefore proof of this criminal disposition
is not admissible under Rule 5-609.132 Similarly, juvenile adjudications
are not considered "convictions"'3 and, therefore, are not admissible
under Rule 5-609.134
129. MD. RULE 5-609(c).
130. MD. RULE 5-609(d).
131. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641 (1992) (probation prior to judgment).
132. See MURPHY, supra note 3, § 1302(B), at 649. However, if after receiving a
probation before judgment the witness violates the probation conditions and
the court subsequently imposes a judgment of conviction, this may be intro-
duced if otherwise admissible under Rule 5-609. Id. at 650 (citing Myers v.
State, 303 Md. 639, 647-48, 496 A.2d 312, 316 (1985) (a person who receives
probation before judgment under § 641 is not convicted of a crime unless he
violates the probation order and the court enters a judgment on the finding
of guilt)). Further, if a witness receives probation before judgment for conduct
that is relevant to the character trait of untruthfulness, the witness may be
asked whether he or she in fact committed the acts that resulted in the finding
of guilt and imposition of probation before judgment, in accordance with Rule
5-608(b). Id. If the witness denies the prior bad acts, however, the cross-
examiner is bound by the answer. MD. RULE 5-608(b) ("The conduct may not
be proved by extrinsic evidence.").
133. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-824(a)(1) (1989) ("An adjudication
of a child pursuant to this subtitle is not a criminal conviction for any purpose
134. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.609.3(5), at 155. Professor
McLain observes that the Committee Note at the end of Rule 5-609 points out
that the evidence of juvenile adjudications may be admissible under the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause as evidence of bias. Id. at 154; see, e.g.,
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (Sixth Amendment right of confrontation
requires a defendant in a criminal case to be allowed to impeach the credibility
of a prosecution witness by inquiry into possible bias relating to that witness's
status as a juvenile delinquent).
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A witness impeached by proof of a prior conviction may be
rehabilitated by permitting the witness to deny or explain the im-
peaching facts, although the witness may not deny his or her guilt
of the earlier crime.' 35 Professor McLain notes that this Rule is
intended to codify the Maryland case law that grants the trial court
discretion to allow a witness impeached by evidence of a prior
conviction to explain any extenuating or mitigating circumstances. 13 6
Additionally, the credibility of the witness may be rehabilitated by
any other facts that the court determines are relevant to such reha-
bilitation. 13 7
Perhaps more than any other rule of evidence, Rule 5-609
emphasizes the importance of careful pretrial preparation for im-
peachment. Counsel should make a diligent effort during pretrial
discovery138 to determine whether the opposing party or any other
person who is likely to be an important witness has been convicted
of a crime. If a potential witness has in fact been convicted, counsel
should: (1) analyze the conviction to determine whether it meets the
"nexus to credibility" requirements of Rule 5-609(a)(1); .(2) analyze
the balancing factors of Rule 5-609(a)(2) to enable counsel to argue
to the court why they have or have not been met; (3) determine
whether the date of conviction is more than fifteen years old; (4)
determine whether the conviction was vacated reversed, or whether
a pardon was granted, or with regard to a recent conviction, whether
the time to appeal has expired; (5) obtain a certified copy of the
record of conviction to comply with Rule 5-902(a)(4) on self-authen-
tication, and Rule 5-803(b)(8), the hearsay exception for public
records and reports; (6) review Rule 5-609(a)(4) and be prepared to
establish the factual basis required in that Rule if counsel seeks to
question a character witness about a criminal conviction of a witness
who has previously testified; (7) analyze, if an attorney attempts to
call a witness who has a criminal conviction that would be admissible
under Rule 5-609, whether or not to bring that out first during direct
examination to "draw the string"; (8) give consideration to filing a
motion in limine or requesting a bench conference before cross-
examination if counsel knows that a witness he or she intends to call
has a prior criminal conviction the admissibility of which is not
135. MD. RULE 5-616(c)(1).
136. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.616.4(c), at 184; see, e.g.,
Donnelly v. Donnelly, 156 Md. 81, 86, 143 A. 648, 650 (1928) (if impeached
by evidence of conviction of a crime, a witness may be allowed to explain the
circumstances of the offense in extenuation and mitigation).
137. See MD. RULE 5-616(c)(4).
138. MD. RULE 2-402 (civil discovery, circuit court); MD. RULE 3-421 (civil discovery,
district court); MD. RULE 4-263 (criminal discovery, circuit court); MD. RULE
4-262 (criminal discovery, district court).
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certain under Rule 5-609; (9) consider filing a motion in limine, or
requesting a preliminary determination of admissibility under Rule
5-104 if counsel intends to impeach a witness with evidence of a
prior criminal conviction, and counsel is not certain that the court
will allow such impeachment.
With regard to impeachment by proof of a prior conviction
under Rule 5-609, as with impeachment by proof of the character
trait of untruthfulness under Rule 5-608, the impeachment results
from diminishing the ethos or ethical appeal of the witness rather
than by demonstrating the inaccuracy or inconsistency of the testi-
mony itself, or by diminishing the ability of the witness to perceive,
remember, or relate. Accordingly, if efforts to impeach based on
these two rules are to be successful, the magnitude of the prior bad
act or the nature of the prior conviction must be of sufficient weight
to cause a fair minded jury to form a negative opinion of the
character of the witness, and therefore not want to believe that
witness. This must be kept in mind when planning impeachment
under these two rules because if it is unlikely that the prior bad act
or conviction will be sufficient, alone or in combination with the
other methods of impeachment, to diminish the character of the
witness in the eyes of the jury, counsel should rethink whether the
impeachment should be attempted.
X. IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR STATEMENTS OF THE
WITNESS-RULE 5-613
It has been observed that the "first, and probably the most
effective and most frequently employed [line of attacking the credi-
bility of a witness] is an attack that the witness on a previous
occasion has made statements inconsistent with his present testi-
mony." 139 When properly employed, impeachment by prior inconsis-
tent statements of a witness causes the fact finder to discredit the
testimony of a witness by concluding that the witness, at best, cannot
really remember what happened, or, at worst, that the witness is a
liar. When improperly employed attempts to impeach by showing
prior inconsistent statements fail to diminish the believability of the
witness in the eyes of the jury, the ethos of the attorney may be
diminished and the pathos of the witness may be enhanced. Knowing
139. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 33, at 66; see also MURPHY, supra note 3, §
1302(F), at 675 ("[Proof that a witness has given a prior inconsistent statement
is a most important impeachment technique.").
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how to effectively impeach by prior inconsistent statements starts
with knowing the provisions of Rule 5-613, which governs that form
of impeachment.
Rule 5-613 is divided into two parts. Rule 5-613(a) addresses the
process of examining a witness about prior oral or written inconsistent
statements. Rule 5-613(b) pertains to the introduction of extrinsic
evidence to prove a prior inconsistent statement. There are important
differences between the two.
Rule 5-613(a) allows a lawyer who is examining a witness about
a prior oral or written statement to question the witness about the
statement without first showing it to the witness or making its
contents known to the witness provided that
before the end of the examination (1) the statement, if
written, is disclosed to the witness and the parties, or if the
statement is oral, the contents of the statement and the
circumstances under which it was made, including the per-
sons to whom it was made, are disclosed to the witness and
(2) the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny
it. 140
Rule 5-613(a), therefore, departs from the prior common law of
Maryland, which followed Queen Caroline's Rule. 14' Queen Caroline's
Rule required the examiner to allow the witness to see a prior written
statement before questioning him or her about it, or, in the case of
an oral statement, the attorney was required to orient the witness
with respect to the time, place, date, circumstances, and content of
the prior statement.142 The primary disadvantage of Queen Caroline's
Rule was that it "allow[ed] the liar additional time to conjure up
false explanations for the inconsistency."'' 43 Accordingly, Rule 5-
613(a) changed the common law and now allows the examining
attorney to question the witness about a prior inconsistent statement
140. MD. RULE 5-613(a).
141. MARYLAND PRACTICE, supra note 25, § 613.1, at 162-63 (citing 2 Br. & B. 284,
129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820) (the source of Queen Caroline's Rule)).
142. See generally State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 46 n.8, 375 A.2d 1105, 1114 n.8,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977) (citing requirements for impeachment by
prior inconsistent statements); Whisner v. Whisner, 122 Md. 195, 207, 89 A.
393, 395 (1914) (witness cannot be impeached by prior written inconsistent
statement unless document has first been shown to him); July 1993 Committee
Report, supra note 78, at 77; MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, §
2.613.2, at 168 (citing Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 729 n.2, 569 A.2d 1254,
1266 n.2 (1990) (before introduction of prior inconsistent statement is allowed,
witness must be informed of time, place of statement, as well as its substance));
MARYLAND PRACTICE, supra note 25, § 613.1, at 163; MURPHY, supra note 3,
§ 1302(F)(1), at 677.
143. MURPHY, supra note 3, § 1302(F)(1), at 677.
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without first having to provide him or her with the details regarding
the making of the statement or its content. However, in the interest
of fairness, the examining attorney must, prior to the end of his or
her examination, provide the witness with the information regarding
the statement as required in Rule 5-613(a)(1),' as well as afford the
witness an opportunity to explain or deny the statement.
Further protection is provided by Rule 5-613(b) which, as a
general practice, prohibits introduction of extrinsic evidence of a
prior inconsistent statement until the requirements of Rule 5-613(a)(1)
and (2) have been met. Rule 5-613(b) also provides that, with regard
to extrinsic proof of prior inconsistent statements,
[u]nless the interests of justice otherwise require, extrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is
not admissible under this Rule (1) until the requirements of
section (a) have been met and the witness has failed to
admit having made the statement and (2) unless the state-
ment concerns a non-collateral matter.145
The general prohibition against introduction of extrinsic evidence of
prior inconsistent statements on collateral matters is consistent with
the principles of Rule 5-403 that seek to avoid confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, and wasting court time. Balance is provided,
however, by granting the trial court discretion in the interest of
justice to allow introduction of extrinsic evidence of a prior incon-
sistent statement even if the proponent of this evidence failed to
comply with Rule 5-613(a)(1) and (2), or to allow extrinsic evidence
of prior inconsistent statements regarding a collateral matter.
Rule 5-613 does not give a definition of a "statement," but
Professor McLain notes that a statement would not encompass prior
conduct inconsistent with the subsequent statement.146 However, a
statement would include a prior expression of an opinion that is
inconsistent with subsequent testimony. 147
Similarly, Rule 5-613 provides no guidance with respect to what
is meant by an "inconsistency." However, one commentator analyzed
the issue as follows:
144. The cross-examiner must,. under Rule 5-613(a)(1), disclose a written statement,
or, if an oral statement, the attorney must disclose its contents, the circum-
stances under which it was made, and the persons to whom it was made. MD.
RULE 5-613(a)(2).
145. MD. RULE 5-613(b).
146. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.613.4, at 170. However,
silence might, under proper circumstances, qualify as a "statement" if that
silence is inconsistent with another statement. See MURPHY, supra note 3, §
1302(F), at 676 (citing Devan v. State, 17 Md. App. 182, 300 A.2d 705 (1973)
(silence may qualify as a "statement" for purposes of impeachment by prior
inconsistent statements)).
147. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.613.4, at 170.
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[W]hat degree of inconsistency between the testimony of the
witness and his previous statement is required? The language
of some of the cases seems over strict in suggesting that a
contradiction must be found, and under the more widely
accepted view any material variance between the testimony
and the previous statement will suffice. Accordingly, if the
former statement fails to mention a material circumstance
presently testified to, which it would have been natural to
mention in the prior statement, the prior statement is suf-
ficiently inconsistent. Again, an earlier statement by the
witness that he had no knowledge of facts now testified to,
should be provable. Seemingly the test should be, could the
jury reasonably find that a witness who believed the truth
of the facts testified to would have been unlikely to make
a prior statement of this tenor. Thus, if the previous state-
ment is ambiguous and according to one meaning would be
inconsistent with the testimony, it should be admitted for
the jury's consideration. In applying the criterion of material
inconsistency reasonable judges will be likely to differ, and
a fair range of discretion should be accorded to the trial
judge. Moreover, it is to be hoped that instead of restricting
the use of prior statements by a mechanical use of the test
of inconsistency, the court will lean towards receiving such
statements in case of doubt, to add in evaluating the testi-
mony. These statements, indeed, having been made when
memory was more recent and when less time for the play
of influence has elapsed, are often inherently more trust-
worthy then the testimony itself.'
48
Judge Murphy is in accord. He notes that "flat contradiction"
between the statements is not required. 49 An omission of significant
facts, a contrast in emphasis of the same facts, or even a different
order of treatment of the same facts qualify as inconsistencies under
Rule 5-613.1s0 Thus, what is an inconsistency under Rule 5-613 and
therefore eligible for testing during cross-examination, should be
broadly interpreted.
148. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 34, at 68-69.
149. MURPHY, supra note 3, § 1302(F), at 676 (citing Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657, 667 (1957) (Brennan, J.) ("Flat contradiction between the witness's
testimony and the version of the events given in his reports is not the only test
of inconsistency.")).
150. Id. (citing Jencks, 353 U.S. at 667 (Brennan, J.) ("The omission from the
report of facts related at trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same facts,
even if a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining
process of testing the credibility of a witness's trial testimony.")).
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Another important issue that arises in connection with impeach-
ment by prior inconsistent statements is whether the introduction of
the earlier statement is for the purpose of establishing the truth of
that statement, its "substantive truth," or only for the purpose of
impeaching the credibility of the witness by showing that at different
times she has given different accounts of the same event. The answer
to this question cannot be found in Rule 5-613, but lies instead in
the rules of hearsay. Rule 5-802.1 identifies five types of "prior
statements" made by witnesses that are not excluded from introduc-
tion into evidence for the truth of the assertions contained within at
a subsequent trial. The first is
[a] statement that is inconsistent with the declarant's testi-
mony, if the statement was (1) given under oath subject to
the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding
or in a deposition; (2) reduced to writing and signed by the
declarant; or (3) recorded in substantially verbatim fashion
by stenographic or electronic means contemporaneously with
the making of the statement. 5'
Thus, if a prior statement made by a non-party witness meets the
qualifications under Rule 5-802. 1(a) it is admissible for its substantive
truth as well as to discredit the believability of the witness by showing
that he or she has made inconsistent statements.5 2 This marks an
important departure from the prior common law that usually pre-
cluded admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement to prove its
substantive truth.
In Nance v. State,'53 the Court of Appeals of Maryland examined
the issue of whether a statement introduced to impeach a witness as
a prior inconsistent statement was also admissible to prove its sub-
stantive truth. 54 Nance involved "turncoat" witnesses who gave
written statements and made photo identifications of two defendants
in a criminal case prior to trial.' At trial, the witnesses repudiated
their pretrial statements and identifications, and the prosecution
introduced both. 5 6 The trial judge admitted the prior photo identi-
fications as substantive evidence of guilt, but did not rule as to
whether the prior written statements were admissible as substantive
evidence. 17 He did, however, instruct the jury that, ordinarily, prior
151. MD. RULE 5-802.1(a).
152. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.613.4, at 170, § 2.802.1(1),
at 221.
153. 331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993).
154. Id. at 560, 629 A.2d at 638.
155. Id. at 553-56, 629 A.2d at 635-36.
156. Id. at 556-58, 629 A.2d at 636-37.
157. Id. at 558-59, 629 A.2d at 637-38.
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inconsistent statements were admissible only for impeachment pur-
poses."' The defendants were convicted and appealed. 5 9 The Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed,' 60 and the court of appeals
granted certiorari to address the evidentiary issues raised.16'
The Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that under the "or-
thodox rule" followed by Maryland courts, prior inconsistent state-
ments are not treated as substantive evidence, but only as an
impeachment device. 62 The court observed, however, that Maryland
was one of only a handful of states that still adhered to the "orthodox
rule" and noted that the more widely embraced "modern rule"
permitted introduction of inconsistent statements substantively, pro-
vided the declarant was present in court to testify. 63 It also noted
that because the prior statement was nearer in time to the event in
question, it was likely to be more complete and accurate. 64 Addi-
tionally, the court opined that allowing the prior statement to be
introduced substantively "eliminates the need for a limiting instruc-
tion which asks jurors to carry out the difficult task of separating
substantive proof from impeachment evidence bearing solely on a
witness's credibility.' '165
Although the court appreciated the merits of the modern rule
over the orthodox rule, it declined to adopt it, adopting instead an
intermediate approach.'6 Under that approach, "a prior inconsistent
statement may be used as substantive evidence when that statement
was reduced to a writing signed or adopted by the declarant, and
when the declarant is a witness at trial and subject to cross-exami-
nation."'' 67 The court held that
the factual portion of an inconsistent out-of-court statement
is sufficiently trustworthy to be offered as substantive evi-
dence of guilt when the statement is based on the declarant's
own knowledge of the facts, is reduced to writing and signed
or otherwise adopted by him, and he is subject to cross-
examination at the trial where the prior statement is intro-
duced. To the extent it is inconsistent with this holding, our
opinion in Mouzone v. State is overruled . 68
158. Id. at 559, 629 A.2d at 638.
159. Id.
160. Id.; Nance v. State, 93 Md. App. 475, 613 A.2d 428 (1992).
161. Nance, 331 Md. at 559, 629 A.2d at 638.
162. Id. at 564, 629 A.2d at 641.
163. Id. at 565, 629 A.2d at 641.
164. Id. at 566, 629 A.2d at 642.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 567-69, 629 A.2d at 642-43.
167. Id. at 567-68, 629 A.2d at 642 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 569, 629 A.2d at 643. In Mouzone v. State, the court of appeals declined
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The Nance decision marked the court's first step, albeit a cautionary
one, away from the orthodox rule that prior inconsistent statements
were admissible only for impeachment of credibility. 69
In Sheppard v. State,170 the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land addressed the issue of admissibility of prior inconsistent state-
ments as substantive evidence. 171 In Sheppard, the defendant appealed
a criminal conviction, asserting that the trial judge committed error
by not admitting as substantive evidence prior inconsistent statements
of two prosecution witnesses. 72 The State witnesses had given the
police two pretrial statements, and the second ones were inconsistent
with their subsequent trial testimony.' The defense sought the
introduction of the two statements as substantive evidence, citing
Nance, but the trial judge admitted them only for impeachment. 174
The court of special appeals reversed because it found that the
statements satisfied all of the prerequisites for substantive admissi-
bility identified in Nance.'75 The court also commented on the impact
of the newly adopted rules of evidence, particularly Rule 5-802. 1(a). 17 6
Judge Moylan, writing for the court, concluded the opinion with the
following observation:
Theoretically, there is no reason why a jury could not look
upon a witness and consider his sworn testimony and then
be presented with a smorgasbord of earlier versions of events
given by that witness-some resolutely consistent with the
trial testimony, some wildly inconsistent, and others at
various points between. Opposing counsel could then have
a field day testing, probing, impeaching, and rehabilitating.
It would fall the ultimate lot of the juror to choose on
to admit pretrial identifications as substantive evidence because it refused to
view such statements differently from broader out of court statements contain-
ing information beyond an identification, but which did not fall within a
recognized hearsay exception. Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 702, 452 A.2d
661, 666 (1982).
169. See Nance, 331 Md. at 569, 629 A.2d at 643.
170. 102 Md. App. 571, 650 A.2d 1362 (1994) (decided after the new rules of
evidence went into effect but applying the law which existed before the rules
became effective).
171. Id. at 574-75, 650 A.2d at 1363-64.
172. Id. at 573, 650 A.2d at 1363.
173. Id. at 574, 650 A.2d at 1363-64.
174. Id. at 575, 650 A.2d at 1364.
175. Id.
176. A statement which is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony is not excluded
by the hearsay rule if the statement was given under oath at a trial, hearing,
or other proceeding; or if the statement was written and signed by the declarant;
or if the statement was recorded electronically. See Mo. RULE 5-802.1(a).
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which, if any, version-or amalgam or versions-to bestow
decisive weight and credibility. 77
Although Nance and Sheppard marked an important departure
from the prior orthodox rule that had existed in Maryland, Rule 5-
801.1(a) goes farther still. Because prior deposition festimony is
included in Rule 5-802.1(a) as an example of inconsistent statements
that are admissible for the truth of their substance,7 8 any statement
made during a deposition that is inconsistent with the witness's later
testimony at trial may be offered for both its impeachment value
and for the truth of the earlier statement, provided it is otherwise
admissible. Similarly, Rule 5-803 identifies five types of "admissions"
by a party-opponent that also qualify as exceptions to the hearsay
rule 79 and are therefore admissible for their substantive truth as well
as their impeachment value. If a prior statement does not meet the
qualifications of Rule 5-802.1(a) or 5-803, then the earlier statement
is admissible only for its impeachment value and not for its substan-
tive truth, unless during cross-examination the witness testifies that
the earlier statement was in fact true.' 80
A witness impeached by proof of a prior inconsistent statement
may be rehabilitated by permitting the witness to explain the im-
peaching statement. 8' The witness also may be rehabilitated by
introduction of evidence of prior statements made by the witness
that are consistent with the witness's trial testimony, provided that
the timing of when the prior consistent statements were made detracts
from the impeachment and also providing that such rehabilitation is
not prohibited by statute. 8 2 The "statute" referred to in Rule 5-
616(c)(2) is Section 9-117 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article in the Annotated Code of Maryland, which states:
It is not competent, in any case, for any party to the cause
who has been examined therein as a witness, to corroborate
his testimony when impeached by proof of his own decla-
ration or statement made to third persons out of the presence
and hearing of the adverse party. 83
177. Sheppard, 102 Md. App. at 577, 650 A.2d at 1365.
178. MD. RULE 5-802.1(a).
179. MD. RULE 5-803(a)(1) to (5).
180. MURPHY, supra note 3, § 1302(F), at 675-76 (citing Ali v. State, 314 Md. 295,
550 A.2d 925 (1988) (differentiating between when a prior statement may be
offered for its substantive truth and when it may be offered only for its
impeaching value; explaining that the key is whether the statement is covered
by a recognized exception to the hearsay rule)).
181. See MD. RULES 5-613(a)(2), 5-616(c)(1).
182. See MD. RULE 5-616(c)(2).,
183. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-117 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
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Professor McLain points out that with respect to rehabilitation
by prior consistent statements, the key to determining whether the
statement is admissible is to focus on when it was made.'1 Thus, if
the prior consistent statement was made before the inconsistent
statement that is used to impeach the witness, the prior consistent
statement should be admissible.'8 5 However, if the prior consistent
statement was made after the prior inconsistent statement, but before
the trial when the witness testifies to the facts that resulted in the
impeachment, it should not be admissible. 8 6 Thus, section 9-117187 is
applicable only to rehabilitation by prior consistent statements of a
party, not a non-party witness.'8 8 Further, a failure to timely object
to rehabilitation that violates this statute will waive the objection. 8 9
The approach taken by this statute has been criticized as unsound
because there is no principled reason to distinguish between prior
consistent statements by parties as opposed to non-parties.'19 Never-
theless, it continues to exist. Finally, a witness impeached by a prior
inconsistent statement may also be rehabilitated by any other means
which the trial court finds relevant for this purpose. 9'
Perhaps because it is viewed as the most effective means of
impeachment, there is a tendency to over-use, or at least misuse,
impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. In planning to use
this method of impeachment, lawyers must not forget their knowledge
of human nature. Memory is imperfect, and when people are sub-
jected to the stress of testifying and placed in the usually unfamiliar
surroundings of a courtroom, even honest people with excellent
memories may suffer a momentary lapse. Judges and juries can relate
to this situation, they can also be sympathetic to it. In contrast, if
a person gives two different versions of the same events that differ
in a material way and the subject matter of the different versions is
important to the outcome of the trial, the fact finder, upon learning
of the inconsistent statements, may reach the conclusion that the
witness has intentionally lied. When this occurs, the effect of im-
184. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2.616.4, at 184-85.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-117 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
188. See Cross v. State, 118 Md. 660, 671, 86 A. 223, 227 (1912) ("[O]nly parties
to the cause, who have been examined as witnesses, are forbidden or prohibited
from corroborating their testimony when impeached by proof of their own
declarations or statements made to third person.").
189. See Krouse v. Krouse, 94 Md. App. 369, 388, 617 A.2d 1098, 1107 (1993).
190. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2-616.4, at 185 (citing 4 JOHN
H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE AT TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1126, at 267 n.8 (James
H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 1972)).
191. See MD, RULE 5-616(c)(4).
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peachment is the most dramatic because it undermines both the
accuracy of the witness's testimony-the logos, as well as the char-
acter of the witness-the ethos.
Impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement occurs on a
continuum. At one end of the scale, the fact finder may simply
conclude that a witness whose character is still intact simply is
confused or mistake). At the other end, the fact finder rejects both
the testimony and the character of the witness. The key to successfully
impeaching a witness by use of prior inconsistent statements is to
know how to approach the witness to develop the inconsistency.
Because not every inconsistency will be perceived as a lie, coming
down too hard on a witness over a relatively innocent inconsistency
will not result in impeachment, and may well diminish the ethos of
the attorney in the eyes of the jury. The following factors, which
may be generally grouped into two categories-those that focus on
the statements made by the witness, and those that focus on the
character of the witness-should be evaluated in determining what
approach to take With a witness during impeachment by prior incon-
sistent statement:
(1) the number of inconsistencies;
(2) the importance of the subject matter of the inconsistent
statements to the outcome of the trial;
(3) the degree of inconsistency between the statements;
(4) the certainty with which the witness made the inconsistent
statements ("I think the light was green" versus "there is no doubt
about it, the light was green");
(5) whether there are any other mitigating circumstances which
can explain the inconsistent statements;
(6) whether there is credible corroboration of the witness's trial
testimony from other sources;
(7) the overall impression the witness has made on the jury
during direct-was the witness sympathetic and likeable, or defensive
and unlikable;
(8) the role the witness plays in the case (party or independent
fact witness);
(9) whether the witness is biased, has a motive to testify a certain
way, or has an interest in the outcome of the case; and
(10) whether the witness is subject to impeachment by other
methods in addition to a prior inconsistent statement.
Based upon an evaluation of these factors, an attorney can plan
how to effectively approach impeachment by a prior inconsistent
statement. If the witness is a sympathetic one and the number,
nature, and importance of the inconsistencies are slight, the lawyer
is best advised to use "a gentle impeachment" with a prior statement
that may sound more like a helpful reminder to the witness than
19941
open warfare. 192 Under this "soft approach" the prior statement is
used in a manner akin to refreshing the recollection of the witness
under Rule 5-612, to point out to the witness, and the fact finder,
that inconsistent statements have been made, but not to attack the
character of the witness for having done so. In contrast, a hard,
confrontational approach to impeachment by a prior inconsistent
statement may be appropriate, or even essential, when "the witness
has made a strong statement on direct examination that cannot be
explained away as inadvertence, and he shows every sign of being a
partisan for the other side."' 93
In addition to the approach selected, an attorney who wants to
be effective at impeachment by prior inconsistent statements must
also keep in mind the pace and organization of the impeachment.
To be successful, the attorney must be well prepared and have the
prior statements readily available. Confused efforts to find the in-
consistent statement will not impress the jury and will diminish the
control the attorney has over the witness, which is essential in this
method of impeachment.
Finally, timing is critical. Before confronting the witness with
the inconsistent statement, the lawyer must be sure that either during
the direct or cross-examinations the witness has been firmly pinned
down to the version that he is presenting to the jury. Prematurely
confronting the witness with the earlier statement before the witness
has been committed to the trial version will allow the witness an
opportunity to explain away the apparent inconsistency.
Through a proper evaluation of the factors described regarding
how to impeach by prior inconsistent statement and an understanding
of the different approaches to this method of impeachment, attorneys
will develop the flexibility to effectively use this important tool.
XI. IMPEACHMENT BY BIAS, INTEREST, OR IMPROPER
MOTIVE-RULE 5-616(a)(4), 5-616(b)(3)
Next to impeachment by prior inconsistent statement, perhaps
the most frequent means of impeaching a witness is to demonstrate
"that the witness is biased on account of emotional influences such
as kinship for one party or hostility towards another, or motives of
pecuniary interest, whether legitimate or corrupt."' 94 This form of
impeachment is favored because it causes the fact finder to discredit
192. McElhaney, supra note 65, at 288. Professor McElhaney provides an excellent
illustration of this technique. See id. at 290-92.
193. Id. at 289-90. Once again, Professor McElhaney gives an excellent example of
how the "hard approach" may be used. See id. at 290-92.
194. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 33, at 66.
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the witness's testimony where an ulterior motive exists. 95 Moreover,
this form of impeachment is quite broad, encompassing any facts
which tend to prove bias, prejudice, or interest including: a family
relationship between the witness and a party; the witness's status as
a party; an employment relationship between the witness and a party;
the witness's financial interest in the affairs of a party or in the
outcome of the litigation; the witness's affection for or dislike of a
party, or a group or entity associated with a party, or that the
witness has been influenced in some manner to testify, either through
threat or other improper motivation. 96
The Maryland Rules of Evidence preserve the ability to impeach
a witness through demonstration of bias, interest, or improper mo-
tive. Rule 5-616(a)(4) allows a witness to be impeached by direct or
cross-examination by "[p]roving that the witness is biased, preju-
diced, interested in the outcome of the proceeding, or has a motive
to testify falsely."'' 97 This right is reinforced by Rule 5-611(b)(1),
which defines the scope of cross-examination to include "matters
affecting the credibility of the witness."' 98 These matters include bias,
interest, and improper motive. 99 Similarly, even the general prohi-
bition against attempts to impeach or rehabilitate a witness by
introducing evidence of religious beliefs or opinions is relaxed to
permit introduction of such evidence "to show interest or bias. ' '2 00
Factors that influence the effectiveness of this method of im-
peachment include: (1) the nature and extent of the bias, interest, or
improper motive; (2) how recent the evidence of these factors is; (3)
whether the credibility of the witness is subject to impeachment by
other means as well (e.g., prior inconsistent statements, prior bad
195. MURPHY, supra note 3, §. 1302(E)(1), at 662 (calling this form of impeachment
"the most effective mode of impeachment").
196. MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 607.2, at 43-45 (citing Kantor
v. Ash, 215 Md. 285, 290, 131 A.2d 661, 664 (1958) (dictum) (cross-examination
permitted to show that witness is related to a party)); Johnson v. State, 221
Md. 177, 178, 156 A.2d 441, 442 (1959) (finder of fact entitled to determine
whether evidence that prosecution witness was a paid informant with a criminal
record affected his credibility), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 816 (1960); Adkins v.
Hastings, 138 Md. 454, 462, 114 A. 288, 291 (1921) (evidence was insufficient
to prove that witness had an interest in the outcome of the case by virtue of
witness's financial interest in a business); Hutchinson v. State, 41 Md. App.
569, 573-74, 398 A.2d 451, 453 (1979) (cross-examination permitted to show
that witness was biased in favor of a party), aff'd on other grounds, 287 Md.
198, 411 A.2d 1035 (1980); Daugherty v. Robinson, 143 Md. 259, 266-67, 122
A. 124, 127 (1923) (cross-examination permissible to show bias against testa-
trix-i.e., resentment).
197. MD. RULE 5-616(a)(4).
198. MD. RULE 5-611(b)(1).
199. See MD. RULES 5-616(a)(4), (b)(3).
200. See MD. RULE 5-610.
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acts, prior convictions, or poor character for veracity); and (4)
whether the witness can explain away, minimize, or mitigate the bias,
motive or interest.
In addition, Rule 5-616(b)(3) allows a party to impeach a witness
by "[e]xtrinsic evidence of bias, prejudice, interest, or other motive
to testify falsely . . . whether or not the witness has been examined
about the impeaching fact and has failed to admit it. ' ' 201 Accordingly,
an attorney is not required to confront a witness with the existence
of possible bias, interest, or improper motive, but may instead elect
to prove the condition solely through extrinsic evidence. 202 In this
sense the Rule makes it clear that evidence of bias, interest, or
improper evidence is never deemed a "collateral matter. ' 20 3
If a witness is impeached through the introduction of evidence
of bias, interest, or improper motive, the proponent of that witness's
testimony may attempt to rehabilitate the credibility of the witness
by allowing her to deny or explain the impeaching facts204 or by
other evidence that the court finds relevant for the purpose of
rehabilitation. 205 Such evidence includes extrinsic evidence to rebut
the bias or motive evidence or, if the impeachment amounted to an
attack on the credibility of the witness, evidence given by a character
witness as to the witness's good character for truthfulness. 2 06
As with impeachment by prior inconsistent statements, the effect
of impeachment by demonstrating bias, interest, or improper motive
on the ethos of the witness occurs on a continuum. At one end of
the continuum, the fact finder may conclude that the weight of the
witness's testimony must simply be reduced because of the influence
of the witness's interest, bias, or motive. At the other end, the
evidence of bias, interest, or improper motive may be so strong that
impeachment becomes tantamount to a successful attack on the
character of the witness.
Despite the preferential treatment afforded to this method of
impeachment under the Maryland Rules of Evidence, counsel must
201. MD. RULE 5-616(b)(3).
202. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
203. MARYLAND PRACTICE, supra note 25, § 607.2, at 43-46 (citing Stockham v.
Malcolm, 111 Md. 615, 622-23, 74 A. 569, 572 (1909) (collateral evidence that
would be inadmissible if used to contradict a witness would be admissible to
show bias)).
204. See MD. RULE 5-616(c)(1).
205. See MD. RULE 5-616(c)(4).
206. See MARYLAND PRACTICE, supra note 25, § 607.2, at 46 (citing 4 JOHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1107 (James H. Chadbourn
ed., rev. 1972)); Lassiter v. State, 47 So. 2d 230, 231-32 (Ala. Ct. App.)
(rehabilitation by showing good character for truth and veracity not triggered
by showing family relationship of witness to victim), cert. denied, 47 So. 2d
233 (Ala. 1950).
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remember that the trial court has broad discretion to control the
level of inquiry into the subject matter during cross-examination2 °7
as well as to determine the extent of extrinsic evidence of these
matters that will be allowed.
20 8
XII. IMPEACHMENT BY CONTRADICTION-RULE 5-
616(a)(2), 5-616(b)(2)
Another recognized method of impeachment is to discredit the
testimony of one witness by proving that the facts are not as testified
to by the witness. 20 9 This method of impeachment-referred to as
impeachment by contradiction- may be accomplished through ex-
amination of the witness or through introduction of extrinsic testi-
monial or documentary evidence. 210 If extrinsic evidence is used, Rule
5-616(b)(2) limits the admissibility of such evidence to non-collateral
matters. In the court's discretion, however, extrinsic evidence may
be admitted on collateral matters.2 11
Although Rule 5-616 does not define the word "collateral,"
collateral facts are those which are not material to the case, 2 2 that
is, facts which are not "of consequence to the determination of the
action. ' 2 3 Because there is no bright line test to clearly differentiate
207. See MD. RULE 5-611(b).
208. See MURPHY, supra note 3, § 1302(E)(l)(b), at 665 (citing Collins v. State, 318
Md. 269, 568 A.2d 1 (1990) (finding, in death penalty case, no prejudice to
defendant, and therefore no error, in refusal by trial court to allow introduction
of certain evidence relevant to bias of an accomplice, a prosecution witness)).
209. See MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 33, at 66. Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(2) allows
this form of impeachment to be accomplished through questioning on direct
or cross-examination. See MD. RULE 5-616(a)(2).
210. See MARYLAND PRACTICE, supra note 25, § 607.4, at 50.
211. MD. RULE 5-616(b)(2).
212. MARYLAND PRACTICE, supra note 25, § 607.4, at 50-51.
213. MD. RULE 5-401. For example, assume that in a criminal case the defendant's
alibi witness testifies that at the time the crime was committed, the witness
was with the defendant in a Chinese restaurant called "The Asian Inn." The
Asian Inn, however, specializes in Korean food. If the prosecutor calls the
restaurant owner to the stand during rebuttal to testify that The Asian Inn is
a Korean restaurant, this testimony would clearly contradict the alibi witness's
testimony that the restaurant is Chinese. Despite this contradiction, the testi-
mony of the restaurant owner would almost certainly be inadmissible as a
collateral matter, because whether The Asian Inn is a Chinese or a Korean
restaurant is not material to establishing the elements of the crime with which
the defendant is charged. Allowing extrinsic evidence of such a minor factual
contradiction would contribute little to an assessment of the witness's credibility,
yet would almost certainly increase the likelihood of confusing the issues, and
would waste time.
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collateral facts from material ones, Rule 5-616(b)(2) vests the trial
court with the discretion to determine, in a particular case, whether
extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter may be introduced for the
purposes of impeachment by contradiction. 2 4 This discretion is, of
course, subject to the relevancy requirement of Rule 5-401 and the
balancing test of Rule 5-403 .215
It is noteworthy, then, that there is a difference in approach
between impeachment by introduction of extrinsic evidence of bias,
interest, or improper motive under Rule 5-616(b)(3), and impeach-
ment through introduction of extrinsic evidence to contradict a
witness's prior testimony under Rule 5-616(b)(2). Rule 5-616(b)(3)
unqualifiedly allows extrinsic evidence of bias, prejudice, interest, or
other motive, while Rule 5-616(b)(2) allows extrinsic evidence of
contradicting facts only if it is non-collateral.2 1 6 In its discretion,
however, the court may allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence
on a collateral matter. 2 1
7
If a witness is impeached through contradiction during cross-
examination, the witness may be rehabilitated on direct by offering
an explanation of the impeaching facts. 218 If the impeachment through
contradiction occurs through introduction of extrinsic evidence, re-
habilitation may be accomplished by introduction of any other evi-
dence that the court finds relevant for rehabilitative purposes. 219
Impeachment by contradiction also occurs on a continuum. If
the number of contradictions in a witness's testimony are few, and
they do not deal with facts of central importance to the case, the
effect of such impeachment may be to simply persuade the jury that
the witness is an honest person who is mistaken regarding some
details. However, if the number and nature of the contradicting facts
are great, then the jury may both disregard the accuracy of the
witness's testimony and also conclude that the witness is deliberately
lying. Thus, the impact of impeachment through contradiction on
the ethos of the witness may be great or slight. Further, because
impeachment by contradiction involves the introduction of new facts
214. See MD. RULE 5-616(b)(2).
215. Maryland Rule 5-401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having a ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more ... or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." MD. RULE 5-401. The balancing test of Maryland Rule 5-403
weighs the probative value of the evidence against "unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or . . . undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." MD. RULE 5-403.
216. See MD. RULE 5-616(b)(2), (3).
217. See MD. RULE 5-616(b)(2).
218. See MD. RULE 5-616(c)(1).
219. See MD. RULE 5-616(c)(4).
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to the jury, it impacts upon the logos, or logical support, for the
position impeached.
XIII. IMPEACHMENT OF OPINION TESTIMONY-RULE 5-
616(a)(3)
The final method of impeachment that is specifically identified
by the Maryland Rules of Evidence is Rule 5-616(a)(3). This Rule
permits impeachment of the credibility of a witness by an examination
"[piroving that an opinion expressed by the witness is not held by
the witness or is otherwise not worthy of belief. ' 2 0 There is no
counterpart to this Rule among the methods of impeachment by
introduction of extrinsic evidence listed in Rule 5-616(b). Accordingly,
Rule 5-616(a)(3) impeachment may be accomplished through exami-
nation only.
The Committee Notes and Reporter Notes provide no details
about Rule 5-616(a)(3).22 1 It is a somewhat curious rule because its
apparent goal-permitting a party to attack the credibility of an
opinion witness-may already be accomplished by many of the other
forms of impeachment. For example, proof that an opinion witness
is insincere in the expression of an opinion may be accomplished by
showing that the witness is biased, or has an interest in the outcome
of the litigation, such as a paid expert, under Rules 5-616(a)(4) or
5-616(b)(3). Similarly, an opinion witness's testimony may be im-
peached by demonstrating that the facts are not as testified to by
the witness,2 2 2 or by contradicting the opinion through the testimony
of another witness. 2 13 Further, the veracity of an opinion witness
may be attacked by proof of poor character for truthfulness, prior
bad acts, 224 or conviction of a crime. 225 These methods of impeach-
ment may be accomplished both by examination and through the
introduction of extrinsic evidence.
Rule 5-616(a)(3), therefore, should not be viewed as a limitation
on the methods by which a witness's opinion testimony may be
impeached. Instead, given that opinion testimony may address an
ultimate issue in the case, 226 it should be viewed as an additional tool
for impeachment. As an example, Rule 5-616(a)(3) should give a
cross-examining attorney additional latitude in exploring whether an
opinion expressed by a lay witness is rationally based on perception
220. MD. RULE 5-616(a)(3).
221. See July 1993 Committee Report, supra note 78, at 86.
222. See MD. RULE 5-616(b)(2).
223. Id.
224. See MD. RULES 5-616(a)(6), 5-616(b)(5), 5-608.
225. See MD. RULES 5-616(a)(6), 5-616(b)(6), 5-609.
226. See MD. RULE 5-704(a).
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or is helpful in determining a fact at issue as required by Rule 5-
701. Similarly, with respect to expert opinion testimony, Rule 5-
616(a)(3) should be viewed as affording a cross-examining attorney
greater latitude to explore the qualifications of the expert, 227 the
sufficiency and factual basis of the expert's opinion, 22 and any other
relevant factor that would effect the opinion of the expert. 229 Further,
on cross-examination an expert's opinion may be challenged under
Rule 5-616(a)(3) by the use of a learned treatise in accordance with
Rule 5-803(b)(18).230 Once the opinion of a witness has been im-
peached under Rule 5-616(a)(3), it may be rehabilitated by permitting
the witness to explain or deny the impeaching facts 231 or other
evidence that the court finds relevant for this purpose. 232
XIV. CONCLUSION
It does not require Napoleonic insight to realize that the ability
to successfully impeach and rehabilitate witnesses requires not only
a sound understanding of the Maryland Rules of Evidence that govern
this process, but also an appreciation of the three components of
testimonial persuasion-ethos, pathos, and logos. Perhaps the most
helpful practical advice regarding impeachment is to keep the effort
focused. It is better to successfully employ a single effective method,
rejecting other less viable, but nonetheless available options, than to
thoughtlessly employ every one in the hope that one will find its
mark.
Before beginning, the cross-examiner should take advantage of
all available information regarding the witness and the available
methods of impeachment and plan a line of attack accordingly. If
nothing suggests itself, it may be advantageous to forego all cross-
examination of the witness, and instead to impeach by contradiction
through extrinsic evidence, introduced pursuant to Rule 5-616(b)(2).
The Maryland Rules of Evidence discussed in this Article teach
attorneys to analyze the factors affecting testimonial persuasion and
227. See MD. RULE 5-702. In determining whether expert testimony is admissible,
the court "shall determine (i) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, (ii) the appropriateness of
the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (iii) whether a sufficient
factual basis exists to support the expert testimony." Id.
228. See id.
229. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-703(a), the opinion of an expert witness maybe
based upon "facts or data . . . perceived by or made known to the expert at
or before the hearing." MD. RULE 5-703(a).
230. However, this Rule requires that statements from learned treatises which are
admitted may only be read into evidence, the treatise itself may not be admitted.
See also MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 2-616.1, at 182.
231. See MD. RULE 5-616(c)(1).
232. See MD. RULE 5-616(c)(4).
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foster preparation, a focused and logical approach, fairness, and
economy. There are no loftier goals that a dispute resolution method
can hope to achieve.

